

**Rapid Reaction Peacekeeping under a Blue Flag: a
viable response to today's global environment**

**A Monograph
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Abstract

RAPID REACTION PEACEKEEPING UNDER A BLUE FLAG: A VIABLE RESPONSE FOR TODAY'S GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT By Major Anthony G. DeMartino, Army, 85 pages.

This monograph is a study of whether a standing rapid reaction force is viable for United Nations peace operations. Since the end of Cold War, UN peace operations have vastly increased in size, scope and number. There are high expectations for the UN in the global security environment. Yet the UN has not been able to build momentum and support for peace operations as quickly as most of these situations require. This is a result of the UN's inability to adjust to the rapidly changing global environment.

The monograph details the global environment and the challenges in peace operations presented by globalization and 'new wars'. The fundamental source of new wars is the crisis of state authority; a profound loss of legitimacy is apparent in the post-colonial states in the 1970s and 1980s and in the post communist states after 1989. In issues of sovereignty, the 'Cosmopolitan Approach' highlights that the realist view of sovereignty, where state to state relationships are paramount, is too simplistic. Insertion of a UN rapid reaction force without the consent of the state involved normally violates the norms of sovereignty. However, under the Cosmopolitan Approach, since the state failed at one of its most important tasks, safety of its citizens, United Nations intervention is justified.

Throughout its history, the UN has employed peacekeeping forces hurriedly assembled from member nations to maintain global security and assist in assuring regional stability and global peace. The current method of conducting UN peacekeeping, on the cheap and on an ad hoc basis, is a recipe for failure in the current globalized, new war plagued, international environment. The ability to conduct timely interventions and coordinated deployments in support of peace operations is paramount for the success of UN operations. This requires a rapid reaction capability.

A rapid reaction force provides the international community a viable instrument to project military power quickly and effectively. A rapid reaction force could be deployed for a multitude of purposes. There are four main advantages to a standing rapid reaction force: responsiveness, cost efficiency, international credibility, and deterrence. Each is addressed as well as the specific capabilities that are required in order to create an effective rapid reaction force. Issues concerning UN employment are addressed and none are found to be insurmountable.

Although the UN is struggling to overcome deficiencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation, ultimately the creation of a standing rapid reaction peace operations force is possible. With the momentum gained through improvements over the last five years, a UN rapid reaction force is a viable response to the challenges faced in today's global environment.

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CHAPTER I

Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective - a new world order can emerge; a new era-freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East, and West, North, and South, can prosper and live in harmony... We are now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by the founders of its Charter.¹

President George Bush, 1990

Woodrow Wilson popularized international collective security during the peace process following the First World War. The notion of international collective security is a concept that has its foundation in the assumption that international peace and security is indivisible, and a breakdown of peace no matter where, threatens the peace everywhere.² The acceptance of this theory is rooted in the notion that all nations have an equal interest in the preservation of the international peace and security, and a strong and genuine interest in uniting to deter one another from disturbing that same peace. This implies that any efforts to disturb global peace and security would be treated by all members of the international community as if it were an attack on them all. Such acts of aggression must result in a cooperative international effort to reduce the threat, otherwise the entire theory is invalidated.³

Theories about global security infused the minds of allied leaders during the peace process following the Second World War. They had paid dearly for the failure to ensure global security after the First World War. Their goal in drafting the charter of the United Nations (UN) was to ensure that no threat could ever result in what they had just experienced.⁴

The United Nations is unique among institutions. This uniqueness stems from the founders' ideas of global collective security and the betterment of the global community. Since

¹ As stated by former President George Bush in September 1990, before a joint session of Congress. Cited in: Roberts Adam. "A New Age in International Relations?" *International Affairs* 67, (no. 3, 1991), 519.

² Andrew Butfoy. "Themes within the Collective Security Idea, *Journal of Strategic Studies* (vol.16, no.4 1993), 491-502.

³ Thomas Weiss ed. *Collective Security in a Changing World*. (London: Lynn Reinner Publishers Inc. 1993), 3-7.

⁴ Brian Urquhart, "For a Volunteer Force." *New York Review of Books*. (July 15, 1993), 2-6.

its inception, no organization so totally encompasses the world. The United Nations conducts business in 6 official languages with employees from over 170 countries. The United Nations, with member nations' consent, administers a portfolio with responsibility for virtually every facet of the human and planetary condition. The UN manages this diverse portfolio with a civil staff comparable in size to that of a medium size European city.⁵ In the last decade, the number of peace operations approved by the UN Security Council have increased in number by five fold, but even more significantly is the widening scope of the operations and burdens the UN is willing to shoulder.⁶ A key problem apparent in recent operations is the often torpid military response of the UN to an emerging crisis. Whatever the situation, the UN has not matched requirements with speed of deployment and soldiers on the ground.⁷ The UN, even in less demanding peace operations, has had only limited success in meeting the expectations of rapid response.⁸ The question addressed in this monograph is whether the concept of a standing UN rapid reaction force is a viable response to today's global environment?

Since the end of Cold War, the peace operations of the United Nations have vastly increased in size, scope and number. There are high expectations for the UN in the global security environment. Yet the UN has not been able to build momentum and support for peace operations as quickly as most of these situations require. The most serious shortfalls within UN peacekeeping occur at the operational level.⁹ At the operational level, the majority of the shortcomings are a result of the UN not having a standing headquarters in charge during the most critical stages of the operation, the buildup and deployment. This implies there is no standing organization that conducts mission planning in advance of an operation. A UN peacekeeping

⁵ Erskine Childers & Brian Urquhart, *Towards a more Effective United Nations: Two Studies*. (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1992), 5-10.

⁶ Michael Brown. Ed, *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*.(Cambridge,MA: The Center for Science and International Affairs. 1996), 9-10.

⁷ Durch, William, J. & Vaccaro, Matthew, *The Environment and Tasks of Peace Operations*. (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 1-8.

⁸ Ibid., 7.

mission's normal modus operandi is one based on ad hoc support from member nations. As a result of this informal arrangement, the UN is often criticized for slow response times and ineffective operations.¹⁰

An example of the glaring deficiencies in responding to crisis occurred in the summer of 1994; a Pakistan's offer to provide 3,000 unequipped troops for a mission in Bosnia.¹¹ Germany offered tanks and other arms to augment and support the Pakistani forces, but because the tanks were Western, the Pakistanis needed hands on training. Germany agreed to the training before realizing that to do so would violate Germany's constitution; Austria volunteered to do the training in Germany's stead. Unfortunately a technicality in Austria's constitution also forced them to renege on the promised help. After much searching, and even more time wasted, the training was undertaken by the Slovaks in their country a year later.¹² The end result was twelve months of precious time wasted due to coordination problems. This situation was not only a loss of international prestige for the UN, but also a continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Bosnia.¹³

The idea of a standing United Nations army for peacekeeping operations is not a new one. In fact, a group of UN staff officers advanced the idea as early as 1948.¹⁴ When first discussed, this standing force, was described as a military unit composed of five thousand to ten thousand volunteers placed under the authority of the Security Council and under day to day direction of the Secretary General.¹⁵ The idea included common training, especially in a standard language, for all nationalities. The goal was to create a force that was truly cohesive and yet reflective of the international membership of the United Nations. The United Nations was

⁹ Katz, Samuel, M.; Debay, Yves, *The Blue Helmets Under Fire: Fifty Years of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions*, (New York: Concord Publications Co., 1996), 3-5.

¹⁰ William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 22-26.

¹¹ *The Economist*, 25 June, 1994.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ P.F.Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 134-42.

established in 1945 with the stated purpose to "maintain international peace and security" and to "take effective measures for the protection and removal of threats to peace."¹⁶ Seen in this light, the United Nations Charter provides the organization with a powerful but sometimes overlooked collective security mandate. Chapters 6 and 7 of the UN Charter envisaged enforcement action on a vast scale. In particular, Article 43 called on member nations to make military forces available to the Security Council. Under Article 43, the United States, for example, would be responsible for providing the largest share of the forces -approximately 20 divisions, over 300,000 ground troops, a very large naval force, 1,250 bombers, and 2,250 fighters. This grand plan failed however because the United States and other nations could not agree on the specifics of the plan.¹⁷

Although well trained, this proposed force faced the standard limitations of a unit that size. Even on paper, it was not seen as being capable of long deployments without external support. Since it was limited in its missions, it could not take the place of the large numbers of forces needed in preventive diplomacy, traditional peacekeeping, or large-scale/long term enforcement operations. Despite its shortcoming, the advantage of the proposed force was that it could intervene in the crucial early stages of a crisis to contain the situation until more traditional forces could be deployed.¹⁸

Throughout its history the UN has employed peacekeeping forces assembled on an ad hoc basis from member nations to maintain global security and assist in assuring regional stability and global peace. Although the Cold War confined the United Nations to the margins of global

¹⁴ Lie Trygve, *In the Cause of Peace*, (New York, NY: Macmillan Inc. 1954).

¹⁵ Brian Urquhart, "For a Volunteer Force," *New York Review of Books*, (July 15, 1993), 52-53.

¹⁶ *UN Charter, Chapter VII*, available from <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm>; accessed on 3 March 2002.

¹⁷ Brian Urquhart, *The United Nations Capacity for Peace Enforcement*, available from <http://iisd1.iisd.ca/security/unac/urqudoc.htm>; accessed on 20 March 2002.

¹⁸ Brian Urquhart, "For a Volunteer Force." *New York Review of Books*, (July 15, 1993), 53.

security, even then, the UN has helped to keep those same margins from unraveling.¹⁹ For example, UN peace observers attended the birth of Israel in 1948.²⁰ The Security Council requested the peacekeepers at the time to determine the strength of the new organization as a means of filling the vacuum left when the major powers withdrew from the region.

At the end of the Cold War, the UN seemed to fulfill a hope for successful, effective global peace operations. After the stunning success of the UN-sanctioned, US-led coalition in the Gulf War in 1991, the positive momentum from the victory seemed to serve as the impetus for a global peacekeeping force to permanently guarantee that the seams would never again come undone.²¹ Although governments still look to the UN for solutions and global leadership over a decade after the Cold War, the hope for effective global peace operations has faded and the world still lacks an effective peacekeeping force.²²

Peace Operations

Peace operations have been the *raison d'état* for the United Nations. The attempt to adjust to the varied challenges faced across the globe has resulted in many unique peace missions. There are however, four basic types of peace operations: traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peace operations, humanitarian intervention, and peace enforcement.²³

¹⁹ Marjorie Ann Browne, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current Issues*, (Washington DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Division, 1990), 21.

²⁰ This mission is ongoing still today with armed peacekeepers still overlooking the heights of the Golan between Syria and Israeli.

²¹ William Durch J. & Matthew Vaccaro, *The Environment and Tasks of Peace Operations*. (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 1-6.

²² Jacob Bercovitch et al., *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 1-5.

²³ Durch William J., ed. *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). Some peace operations frameworks look at broader categories of action than in this monograph, for example, diplomatic activities undertaken to head off a crisis. See, for example, United States Army, *Peace Operations*, Field Manual 100-23 (Washington D.C. Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994). The US Army uses the categories -support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. NATO categories include -conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, and humanitarian operations. See Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, *ACE Doctrine for Peace Support Operations*, ACE (Allied Command Europe) Directive No. 80-62, Mons, Belgium, 22 September 1995.

A *traditional peacekeeping* force is positioned between former belligerents and monitors a cease-fire, creating the political space and providing the time (by preventing or at a minimum greatly reducing the violence between belligerents), for negotiations aimed at addressing the causal factors of the dispute. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute proceed separately from the peacekeeping operation. These missions are conducted with the full consent of the parties involved in the conflict and peacekeepers are deployed only after some type of cease-fire agreement has been obtained.²⁴

An example of a traditional peacekeeping mission is the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II). UNEF II was created in 1973 after the October Arab-Israeli war with an initial mandate to supervise the October cease-fire line between Egyptian and Israeli forces (UNEF I was dispatched to the Sinai in 1956 in response to the Suez Crisis). The conditions under which UNEF II was created included the following: cease-fire resolution arranged by the United States and the Soviet Union; a valid enforcement capability by both the US and Soviet Union which placed forces on alert to intervene if necessary; and diplomatic efforts by the US Secretary of State to establish a disengagement of forces agreement.²⁵ Later (January 1974 and September 1995) the mandate was expanded to include supervising the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces and manning the buffer zone established under those agreements. UNEF II assisted negotiations aimed at reestablishing international peace and security. Due to the resulting peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in March of 1979, it was highly regarded as the model for future operations.²⁶

A *Peace enforcement* operation uses coercion to deal with a crisis situation and creates a de facto cease-fire line in order to facilitate negotiations between belligerents, or to protect noncombatant populations facing the chaos that follows a collapse in the local government. A peace enforcement operation may also be authorized to use coercion to maintain a cease-fire or

²⁴ Durch, 3.

²⁵ Marjorie Ann Browne, 26-27

implement a peace accord in particularly dangerous circumstances. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the legal limitations under which a deployed force must conduct its mission. ROE for a standard peacekeeping mission include the following: force is permitted only in self-defense; peacekeepers must report on but cannot intervene in violent incidents; and only passive surveillance techniques are authorized.²⁷ In a peace enforcement mission, the ROE shifts to graduated force (a soldier judges what he needs to do to assure his own safety) and permission to prevent/intervene in violent incidents as opposed to just reporting the incident.²⁸

Whereas peacekeeping is permissive and has gained the consent of both parties, peace enforcement operations obviously do not require the same level of consent. Peace enforcement operations derive their authority from Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.²⁹ While traditional peacekeeping missions maintain a previously agreed upon cease-fire or resolution, peace enforcement is most often used to restore peace and security in an area of operations rather than to monitor or maintain a resolution. Unlike peacekeeping, peace enforcement does not require the consent of all parties prior to a deployment.³⁰

Enforcement actions have been used in very few cases such as the Gulf war, Somalia, and East Timor. These enforcement operations were not under direct UN control. Instead a single country or a group of countries directs these missions. Although not directly under UN control, these actions were sanctioned by the Security Council. The international force authorized by the

²⁶ Ibid., 27.

²⁷ Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990), 5.

²⁸ Hugh Smith, ed., *Peacekeeping Challenges for the Future*, (Canberra: Australian Defense Studies Center, 1994), 20-25.

²⁹ *UN Charter: Chapter VII*, available from <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm>, accessed on 3 March 2002. This chapter of the UN Charter empowers the UN Security Council to authorize "such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations." States have accorded a special status to Chapter VII operations because they are conducted at the behest of the Security Council. See also, Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping." *International Affairs*, (no.3, 1993), 455.

³⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda for Peace, The United Nations, Position Paper of the Secretary General*, (New York: United Nations Headquarters, 1995), 26.

Security Council for East Timor in 1999, for example, was led by Australia and consisted of troops from 22 Member states.³¹

Implementing a peace enforcement mandate generally requires military superiority over local forces. In practice, such superiority suppresses organized, conventional conflicts, it requires accompanying diplomatic action to resolve underlying causal factors. Ultimately, the successful conclusion of such an operation must entail some form of political settlement. Simply suppressing conflict and violence is not sustainable and should not be viewed as a satisfactory endstate. The real endstate must always address the underlying political and social situation.³²

Multidimensional peace operations emerged near the end of the Cold War as the permanent members of the UN Security Council were able to agree on more ambitious operations to assist nations suffering from conflict and crises reach a sustainable peace. Multidimensional peace operations include a mandate not only to reduce the tension between former foes (as in traditional peacekeeping) but include a requirement to implement a peace accord. The peace accord is normally focused on the underlying causes of the original conflict and is much broader in scope than a peacekeeping mandate. In most cases, there is an implementation schedule and a timeline. When the specific terms of the accord are met, the peacekeepers consider the mission accomplished and redeploy. The reverse is also true; when the terms cannot be met and the violence cannot be prevented, the mission is considered a failure and the peacekeepers are withdrawn. The UN uses the operational deadline as a negotiating advantage in exerting leverage over the local parties.³³

An example of a multidimensional peace operation was the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed into Croatia in February 1992. Like most of Yugoslavia, Croatia

³¹ *United Nations Peacekeeping: Questions and Answers*, available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ques.htm>, accessed on 25 February 2002.

³² William J. Durch & J. Matthew Vaccaro. *The Environment and Task of Peace Operations*. As found in, *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*, Antonia Handler Chayes & George T. Raach eds. (Washington D.C.:National Defense Press, 2001),30.

consisted of a mixed ethnic population primarily of Croats and Serbs. The tension between these two ethnic groups escalated to the point that fighting broke out in early 1991. Fighting continued at varied levels until, in November of 1991, under considerable international pressure, all parties agreed to an unconditional cease-fire and the presence of UN peacekeeping forces. The cease-fire almost immediately broke down leading to UNPROFOR deployment of February 1992. UNPROFOR's initial mandate was to "create conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis."³⁴

UNPROFOR's mandate included several operational objectives: oversee demilitarization, disarm Serb forces in the UN protected areas, guarantee security to persons in UN protected areas, interpose itself if fighting between the two groups flared up, assist humanitarian agencies in delivering relief supplies, and (in 1994) man a buffer between the two sides when they finally agreed to separate.³⁵ Although UNPROFOR achieved some initial success, the lightly armed troops were unable to protect the civilians in the protected areas. It was too small a force to achieve all the missions assigned and too lightly armed to present much of a threat to those who intended to ignore the peace.³⁶ Thus, as this example so clearly illustrates, multidimensional peace operations are very challenging and a careful balance must be maintained between missions and resources

Multidimensional peace operations primarily involve the settlement of internal conflicts. As most of the hostility is confined within the boundaries of one country, they operate in a much more complex domestic political environment than a traditional peacekeeping operation. Moreover, although multidimensional peace operations usually operate with the full consent of the local parties, the military component may be authorized to use limited force against local

³³ William J. Durch, 4.

³⁴ *U.N. Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992*, available from <http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u920221a.htm>; accessed on 25 February, 2002.

³⁵ Christine M. Cervenak, "Lessons of the Past: Experiences in Peace Operations", as found in, *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*, Antonia Handler Chayes & George T. Raach eds, (Washington DC: National Defense Press, 2001), 43-49.

elements that actively hinder implementation of the peace accord. Thus, multidimensional peace operations usually entail greater risk of casualties to the peace force as compared to traditional peacekeeping, while the more chaotic situation exerts greater pressure upon the peacekeepers to use greater degrees of force in order to accomplish the original mandate. These operations also raise important issue of national sovereignty, since the UN does not always have belligerent agreement prior to deploying peace forces. The issue of sovereignty will be addressed in a follow-on chapter.³⁷

Multidimensional UN operations include a civilian component which is usually larger than the military component. In most missions the person with overall responsibility is a UN chief of mission acting as, “Special Representative of the Secretary-General.” The military component provides the secure environment that allows the civilian component to conduct day to day business. For the military component this mission may include a number of tasks not found in traditional peacekeeping, such as guarding polling stations, transporting refugees to resettlement areas, and assisting with the demobilization and disarmament of local forces.³⁸ This sort of operation requires better trained peacekeepers from the member nations' military contingents when compared to required training levels for traditional peacekeepers. This higher level of training is necessary because the environment is more fluid and certainly not strictly a military problem. The peacekeepers in this environment cannot predict the threats the peacekeepers will face from day to day. They have to be trained on a broader range of tasks to be ready for virtually every contingency. They are also sent forward in smaller sized elements with the rank of the peacekeeper in charge being relatively junior. These junior ranked peacekeepers need extra training to broaden their decision making abilities.³⁹

³⁶ Ibid., 43-49.

³⁷ William J. Durch & J. Matthew Vaccaro, 21-24.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 6-11.

Whereas traditional and multidimensional operations help to secure an emerging peace, *humanitarian interventions* are undertaken to relieve suffering in the midst of an ongoing conflict or situation of general anarchy. Humanitarian interventions are considered a temporary measure to help non-combatants survive the stresses of war and to relieve acute suffering brought on by natural disasters or war. As the UN discovered in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, once deployed, humanitarian assistance missions can be difficult to terminate without a clear end of the conflict. The initial humanitarian intervention involves an immediate relief to the suffering of the people, it is however much more difficult and time consuming to effect the root causes of the problems.⁴⁰

Intervention in Somalia came almost a year after the last remnants of a national government in that country had disintegrated. At that time, millions were at risk of starving and approximately 300,000 people had already succumbed to disease and starvation.⁴¹ The United States took the initiative in deploying troops in support of a Security Council approved operation to relieve the suffering of the Somalis. The US force that arrived in late 1992 provided the security necessary to deliver the food and medicines. Although it feared that an immediate relapse into anarchy would follow a total withdrawal, the US rejected an indefinite troop commitment to Somalia. Therefore the US urged a follow on UN led mission. The UN led force arrived in Somalia in mid 1993. Whereas the US-led Unified Task Force for Somalia (UNITAF) had been able to reduce armed conflict in South Central Somalia, the UN led operation was militarily weaker and more vulnerable to challenges from the local factions. Conflict levels rose as the UN forces slowly resembled just another faction fighting for control of Mogadishu, the wartorn capital of Somalia. US forces left in March 1994, after suffering embarrassing losses made all the worse through the international media. The UN force withdrew approximately one

⁴⁰ *United Nations Operation in Somalia*, Department of Public Information, United Nations, (New York: United Nations Headquarters, 1997), available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>; accessed on 10 December 2001.

⁴¹ Ibid.

year later in March 1995. Civil war and anarchy continues in Somalia to this day with all the associated human sufferings.⁴²

Humanitarian interventions might appear to violate sovereignty since they involve deploying military and civilian personnel without local consent. The Security Council overrules the UN Charter's otherwise overarching prohibition on interventions "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"⁴³ of a state by viewing this operations as a "threat to international peace and security."⁴⁴ The risk of the conflict spreading to other states or an exodus of refugees are examples of the 'threat to peace and security' as viewed by the UN. However, humanitarian interventions may also be viewed as an effort to protect the source of a state's sovereignty, namely, its populace, from the ravages of civil war or a renegade government.⁴⁵

Humanitarian interventions are a rather new type of peace operation and are operationally more complex and difficult. In practice it is often difficult to prevent 'mission creep' and limit the scope of the operation to simply safeguarding civilian food and medical supplies and ensuring the distribution of the same. Usually, civil order has broken down completely, so that intervening forces are almost automatically forced into assuming this role. Once supplies have been escorted to regional distribution centers, someone needs to prevent looting and black marketing. If further distribution to the population is not supervised and protected by the intervention force, supplies may be siphoned off by local power brokers. The whole operation may have to look the other way at times to avoid being dragged into the local disputes that ignited the crisis in the first place. Such assiduous efforts to draw a line between protecting food and protecting its recipients is a

⁴² William J. Durch, ed., 20.

⁴³ Ibid., 24.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 21-26.

very fine one to walk, and may become morally and politically untenable, leading to a broadening of the intervenors' mandate despite the deployed force's best efforts.⁴⁶

Part of the inherent complexity of humanitarian intervention stems from the presence of multiple national, international, or nongovernmental relief groups. These groups may have been involved in the area prior to the UN's intervention. Their protection may have been the catalyst of the intervention. These organizations, even those nominally part of the UN system, have their own agendas, field objectives, and sources of funding. The peace force must interact with these groups to coordinate activities for shared information and action. The aid workers while they might need the protection provided by a military force, the aid workers are often reluctant to cooperate, out of a lack of understanding about the military and concern that such cooperation might damage the aid worker's effectiveness.⁴⁷

One of the most important aspects of a humanitarian operation is the importance of recognizing how implicitly political missions of this nature tend to be. Specifically, the handling of the political dimension by the highest levels, including the Secretary General, weighs heavily on the eventual success of the mission. As example, in Northern Iraqi, the political problem of 400,000 refugees from an ethnic group without a state was addressed as an extension of the Gulf War. There was a residual responsibility to see the matter through. Although justified by the Security Council as a humanitarian mission, the UN violated the traditional bounds of sovereignty by its occupation of the northern sector of Iraq. Overall, the political acceptance of the situation

⁴⁶David A. Charters, ed., *Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution*. Proceedings of the sixth annual conference, (Fredericton, NB: University of New Brunswick, Center of Conflict Studies, 1994).

⁴⁷ *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: A Far Reaching Report by an Independent Panel*, (United Nations, 2000), available from http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/; accessed on 25 November, 2001.

by all the major national powers involved helped assure the success of the mission and provided for the needs of the refugees.⁴⁸

The human rights abuses in intra-state conflicts are among the most horrific in the world.⁴⁹ Internal conflicts pose a threat to regional and world stability and peace, as warfare often spills into neighboring countries, endangering the security of external governments, economies and citizens, giving rise to humanitarian crises. In 1996, 19 ongoing situations of internal violence around the world in which 1,000 people or more were killed. In the same year, there were also 40 "low-intensity conflicts," each causing hundreds to die. Thousands of deaths are estimated to have gone unreported in these conflicts, raising the costs of violence in the post-cold war era even higher. The sum price in lives for the year was over six million.⁵⁰

In addition to the number of lives lost, a tremendous amount of suffering, displacement and destruction is caused by these conflicts. Basic human rights are violated continually during and after intra-state warfare. Torture, systematic attacks on civilians and the "ethnic cleansing" of entire populations are common in internal conflicts, as are measures restricting people's freedom of movement, including mass expulsions. Children suffer the most, young girls are kidnapped, raped, and profited from by forced prostitution; young boys are forced into combatant roles where they are treated little better than expendable ammunition.⁵¹

Peace operations take place, almost by definition, in a multilateral political-military environment. Soldiers in the field are required to exhibit impartiality and restraint in wielding force to an almost impossible degree. Peace operations may require the implementation of a cease-fire between two fighting forces, or deployment in the midst of a civilian population, which is trying to recover from a civil war. In most cases, the rules of engagement prevent

⁴⁸ Chris Seiple, *The US Military/ NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions*. Peacekeeping Institute, (Carlisle, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership US Army War College, 1996), 170-175.

⁴⁹ Peace Security and Human Rights: Challenges for the 21st Century. *United Nations Foundation*. Available from http://www.unfoundation.org/programs/humanitarian/challenges_pshr.asp; accessed on 25 March, 2002.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

peacekeepers from siding with any one faction. The use of force is restricted and can, in certain operations, signal the failure of the mission and a shift from peacekeeping to force protection.⁵²

The objectives of peace operations generally will include neither victory, in the ordinary sense of defeating a defined enemy militarily, nor identification of an enemy. A peacekeeping victory is the successful implementation of a peace accord and the accompanying return to normalcy for the population involved. Whereas combat operations normally involve a limited number of nations and their close allies, peace operations are almost always undertaken in cooperation with other countries and increasingly under an international, (United Nations) operational mandate. The increase in the number of contributing nations adds a level of complexity to the entire operation, especially command and control. Given that most states insist on retaining ultimate command and control of the forces they contribute to such operations, peace operations command and control tends to be less streamlined than single nation operations. Finally, varying levels of training and professionalism among military units of different nationalities make all but the simplest and most static peace operations difficult to implement and restrict the ability of an operation to adapt to changing political-military circumstances.⁵³

Generic measures of success for peace operations are difficult to formulate because the mandate of each operation (its operational objective) is different. Paul Diehl, of the University of Illinois, offers two basic criteria for evaluating traditional peacekeeping operations. First, how well an operation deterred or prevented violent conflict in its area of responsibility. Second, how much did the operation facilitate “resolution of the disagreements underlying the conflict.”⁵⁴ These two criteria are helpful in estimating an initial degree of success, yet they are surprisingly

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Antonia Chayes & George Rausch, 24-25.

⁵³ *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: A Far Reaching Report by an Independent Panel*, United Nations September 2000, available from http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/; accessed on 9 November 2002.

⁵⁴ Paul F. Diehl, 34-37. Also see Robert C. Johannsen, “U.N. Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success?” *Mershon International Studies Review* 38(1994), 308-310.

difficult to apply in practice because each contingent member, local ruler, and the UN all have differing views on endstate expectations.⁵⁵

As an example of how complicated defining one standard for success is, take the relatively simple UN operation in Cyprus. This operation involves separating the Turkish and Greek communities with a small buffer zone between the two distinct halves of the island. This mission has been successful because it has prevented substantial armed conflict for more than 20 years (first criterion). Unfortunately, it has also failed for essentially the same reason. By preserving the peace, the local leaders have become complacent and are not motivated to settle their grievances (second criterion) the entire situation has moved into a state of equilibrium, from which it has not budged in twenty years. Countries that did not want to involve themselves with a problem that might create a rift in NATO value the operation. The Greek Cyprus government, however, believes the continued division of the island is a method for the Turkish Cypriot regime to use the island as a de facto forward staging base for the Turkish military.⁵⁶

The first test to the United Nations collective security abilities originated in 1948 when the UN Security Council sent observers to monitor the truce between Israeli forces and its Arab neighbors. Since that time, the UN peacekeeping forces have been involved in operations around the world. They have helped to maintain or reestablish peace in areas that have been the scene of armed conflict.⁵⁷ Today United Nations peacekeeping is at a crossroads. The number of UN peacekeeping missions is declining and may soon be at the lowest level since 1989. This reduction in current operations might provide a window of opportunity for the United Nations to stop and reflect on ways to improve the organization.⁵⁸ The question yet remains unanswered; will the UN be prepared to face the challenges of rapid reaction peacekeeping in the 21st

⁵⁵ William J. Durch, ed., 28-29.

⁵⁶ Durch, ed., 30-33

⁵⁷ Donald Altshiller, ed., *The United Nations' Role in World Affairs*, (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1993), 17-24.

⁵⁸ *Peacekeeping and Rapid Deployment*, available from www.dfaiteci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/rtrn1le.asp; accessed on 10 January 2002.

Century.⁵⁹ Is the concept of a standing UN rapid reaction force a viable response to today's global environment?

⁵⁹Bercovitch, 1-5.

CHAPTER II

Rapid Reaction Force and Sovereignty

*When anyone asked him where he came from, he said,
"I am a citizen of the world."*

Diogenes Laertius, Life of Diogenes the Cynic

Sovereignty is defined as, "the exercise of or right to exercise, supreme power; dominion; sway; supremacy; independence, also, a sovereign state; independent of, and unlimited by, any other; possessing, or entitled to, original authority or jurisdiction; as, a sovereign state; a sovereign discretion".⁶⁰ Insertion of a UN rapid reaction force into conflicts without the consent of the state involved violates the traditional norms of sovereignty. The cosmopolitan movement and the mores it champions provide a justification for the UN for its infringement upon state sovereignty for the good of suffering citizens. This is the heart of the argument made when, in cases of humanitarian intervention, the Security Council overrules the Charter's otherwise overarching prohibition on interventions "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction."⁶¹

The cosmopolitan movement has its roots in Ancient Greece. Diogenes refused to be defined by his local origins and local group memberships, which were so central to the self-image of a conventional Greek male. He insisted on defining himself in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns. The Stoics who followed his lead developed this image of the world citizen more fully, arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities – the local community of our births, and the community of humanity. It is this latter community that is the source of our moral obligation, we should "regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and

⁶⁰ Definition available from www.dictionary.com; accessed on 20 February 2002.

⁶¹ Durch, ed., 20.

neighbors.”⁶² According to this theory, one should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.⁶³ A thought much echoed by the Security Council when debating deployments.

The Stoics were not proposing the abolition of local and national forms of government. They had no intention of creating a world state. Rather, our first allegiance should be to the moral community made up of the humanity of all human beings.⁶⁴ It does not require forfeiture of allegiances to local affiliations. It emphasizes that patriotic pride is both morally dangerous and, ultimately, subversive to some of the worthy goals that patriotism serves. National unity is one such goal, but only if accompanied by worthy moral ideals of justice and a belief in equality for all. These goals are best served by those who have primary allegiance to the community of human beings in the entire world –the Cosmopolitan.⁶⁵

The term “cosmopolitan,” drawn from the philosopher Emmanuel Kant, implies an existence of a human community with certain rights and obligations. In *Perpetual Peace*, Kant envisaged a world federation of democratic states including specific 'cosmopolitan rights'. Kant's notions of cosmopolitan rights are limited to those of “hospitality” –strangers and foreigners should be treated as honored guests with all the respect granted to family members.⁶⁶

Mary Kaldor uses the term, ‘cosmopolitan rights’ in a broader sense, she and other followers of the modern cosmopolitan movement include concepts of a positive political vision, which embraces tolerance and democracy, as well as respect for overriding universal humanitarian principles that should guide communities at all levels, including global. This

⁶² Plutarch, *On the Fortunes of Alexander*. As cited in Martha Nussbaum. *Partriotism and Cosmopolitanism*, available from www.phil.uga.edu/faculty/wolf/nussbaum1.htm; accessed on 21 December, 2001, 1-2.

⁶³ Martha Nussbaum, *Partriotism and Cosmopolitanism*, available from www.phil.uga.edu/faculty/wolf/nussbaum1.htm assessed on 21 February 2002, 1-3.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 2-4.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 4-6.

⁶⁶ Hans Reiss Ed., *Perpetual Peace (1795), Kant's Political Writings*. Cambridge, Mass.:Cambridge University Press, 1992).

modern cosmopolitan movement is a possible solution to the current 'new wars' faced by the UN in today's global environment.⁶⁷

In the Twentieth Century the nation-state system reached its apogee culminating in the barbarity of totalitarianism and war. New wars result from the extreme erosion of the autonomy of the nation-state under the impact of globalization. These new wars could be described as implosions of the nation-state.⁶⁸

The fundamental source of new wars is the crisis of state authority, a profound loss of legitimacy that became apparent in the post-colonial states in the 1970s and 1980s and in the post communist states after 1989. What is new about the crisis of state authority in the 1980s and 1990s is not just the uncompleted character of the 'civilizing'⁶⁹ process in non-western societies but rather, something that can be described as the opposite –the unraveling of the process. The monopoly of violence and taxation once controlled by the instruments of the nation state are being eroded and the balance between what was once the domain of the public is now coveted and controlled by private exclusive organizations (black market).⁷⁰

The breakdown of the nation state becomes worse as corruption and clientism leads to erosion of the tax revenue base through a declining legitimacy of government. As citizens become frustrated with governments inability to arrest the decline in social services, they feel less of a need to pay taxes and conduct themselves in a civic manner further leading to a drop in production. The declining tax revenue leads to growing dependence both on external sources and on private sources for services that use to be provided by the government; through for example, criminal activity. Reductions in public expenditures as a result of shrinking fiscal base as well as

⁶⁷ Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 2-9.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 115-117

⁷⁰ Mary Kaldor, *Cosmopolitanism and Organized Violence*, Paper prepared for Conference on 'Conceiving Cosmopolitanism', (Warwick, April 2000).

pressure from external sources –the global economy- further erodes any remaining legitimacy of the nation state.⁷¹

The disruption of the national level economy creates a vacuum that is soon filled by an informal economy. Associated with this informal economy is an increase in inequities, unemployment, and rural-urban migration. The combined effect of all these factors, especially the breakdown of family structure weakens the rule of law. If nothing is done to arrest the degradation eventually the re-emergence of privatized forms of violence occurs –organized crime and the substitution of ‘protection’ for taxation, vigilantes, private security guards protecting economic facilities, especially international companies, paramilitary groups associated with particular political factions. These factors all further weaken any remaining political state and heap more shaving onto the tinder waiting a spark to burst into the flames of yet another new war.⁷²

Democracy at the national level is weakened beyond repair by the erosion of state autonomy and an undermining of the state’s capacity to respond to democratic demands of its citizens. As the state breaks down, many of the essential prerequisites of democratic procedures: rule of law, separation of powers, freedom of association and expression, atrophy through neglect.⁷³

These are the circumstances that give rise to ‘new wars’. It is the lack of authority of the state, the weakness of representation, the loss of confidence in what the state is capable of providing, the inability and/or unwillingness to regulate the privatization and conditioning to ever increasing levels of violence that gives rise to violent conflict. This whole ‘uncivilizing’ process

⁷¹ Tom G. Palmer. Liberalism: Cosmopolitan or Nationalist? *Humane Studies Review*. (Vol.10. No 2. Spring 1996), 1-3.

⁷² Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 90-101.

⁷³ Kaldor, *Cosmopolitanism and Organized Violence*, 1-3.

is reinforced by the animosity of the conflict, which further degrade the political, social, and economic dynamics in a spiral of incivility.⁷⁴

Although called wars, these conflicts could also be described as massive violations of human rights, repression against civilians, and organized crime, violence for private gain. They are violent struggles to gain access to or to control the remnants of the state. In these wars, violence is itself a form of political mobilization. Violence is mainly directed against civilians and not another army. The aim is not to capture territory in the traditional sense but to do so through political control. A form of political control maintained through terror and if that fails expulsion and finally extermination. Population displacement, massacres, widespread atrocities are not just side effects of new war. Instead, they are the cold calculated strategy for political gain. The tactic is to sow the 'fear and hate' on which exclusive identity claims rest.⁷⁵

International cooperation of those who consider themselves the cosmopolitans; the people most often described as civil society, the new transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the human rights community, and those who support multiculturalism. The argument is that a system of global justice based on a cosmopolitan moral position is one of the most effective measures to counter the causal factors of new wars⁷⁶. Thus an alliance between the global center and the activist cosmopolitans implies a 'civilizing' process. The aim is a rights based system of global governance. It implies a social contract that guarantees the rights of humanity to all, no matter how remote and extreme the situation. This requires an enforcement arm to provide the guarantee, a role ideally suited to the United Nations.⁷⁷

It follows from the argument about the character of new war that efforts aimed at conflict prevention or management should focus on a reversal of the 'uncivilizing process'. It should

⁷⁴ Kaldor. *New & Old War*, 106-111.

⁷⁵ Mary Kaldor. *Cosmopolitanism and Organized Violence*. Paper prepared for Conference on 'Conceiving Cosmopolitanism', Warwick, 27-29 April 2000. 5

⁷⁶ Kaldor, *Cosmopolitanism and Organized Violence*, 7-8.

⁷⁷ Ashton B. Carter, et al., "A New Concept of Cooperative Security," *Brookings Occasional Papers*. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1992), 24-30.

attempt to reconstruct the relations based upon agreed rules, and above all the restoration of legitimate authority. To serve as the counter weight to fear and hate, a strategy of hearts and minds must be developed. This level of restoration of legitimate government cannot mean a reversion to extreme levels of government. It implies multi-layered authority –global, regional, and local as well as national level governance.⁷⁸

Such an approach requires a form of cosmopolitan politics to counter the politics of exclusion. Today's cosmopolitan politics is usually associated with civil society, especially NGOs and independent media. What is needed to combat the causal factors of the plague of new war is a strong injection of what Kaldor refers to as 'a transnational alliance that includes local actors as well as international activities committed to a cosmopolitan approach.'⁷⁹ A transnational alliance led by the United Nations. It is possible to envision a UN charged with the mission of cosmopolitan enforcement establishing a permanent multinational force as the arm through which the rights of every member of the cosmopolitan society are assured.⁸⁰

Kaldor's views new wars as failure of political institutions to protect its citizens. How and whether this protection is provided will be the measure of success for political institutions of the future. The United Nations has an opportunity to step in and set the people on a better path than currently exist in an area engulfed by 'new wars'. The extent to which it is possible to echo Diogenes' claim to be a world citizen depends on whether protection can be guaranteed at the global level.⁸¹

Perhaps it is possible to create a global social contract, which with the UN as overseer and enforcer when necessary, might guarantee the implementation of fundamental human rights. The moral question is in the new wars, is it possible to find cosmopolitans who risk their lives not

⁷⁸ Kaldor, *Cosmopolitanism and Organized Violence*, 7-8.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 118-125.

⁸¹ Kaldor, *Cosmopolitanism and Organized Violence*, 2.

for a national flag or government but instead risks all to save a human simply because he or she is human?

United Nations Response to Issues of Sovereignty

The UN Charter enshrines the principle of the sovereign equality of states. The commitment of international organizations during the UN period to the global application of this principle is historically unparalleled. Almost all earlier systems of states contained strong elements of sovereignty and other types of formal or informal relationships of dominance.⁸² Many such elements have in fact remained features of international relations in the UN era. Nevertheless, the strength of the commitment to sovereign equality has added legitimacy to attacks on inequality and dominance and has shaped the structure of global relationships since the inception of the United Nations.⁸³

Perceptions that the UN is dominated by particular states can have serious consequences. They have led to refusals to make contributions to various parts of the UN budget; to disregard of General Assembly resolutions; and to mixed support for Security Council enforcement initiatives. In the 1960s the rise of the Third World majority in the UN General Assembly and the frequent Soviet support of Third World positions, led to a completely perception, especially in the United States, of an organization biased against the West. As a result, the United States used every opportunity to avoid interacting with the United Nations. In an organization that has to make decisions in matters involving both general principles and harsh realities, any sort of consistency

⁸² Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A comparative Historical Analysis*. London: 1993), 11-20.

⁸³ Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury. *Presiding Over a Divided World: Changing UN Roles 1945-1993*, (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1994), 56-58.

is extraordinarily difficult to achieve, even with a relative good history of evenly applied procedural standards.⁸⁴

The Charter does make some accommodations to hierarchies of power, most notably in the provisions regarding the five permanent members of the Security Council (US, Russia, France, UK, China). Inequality, if not hegemony, is a fundamental feature of international life, and it would be remarkable if it were not reflected in the practice of the UN.⁸⁵ While the UN's track record has not always been consistent, it has generally accepted the core idea of equal sovereignty for independent states. Trends in the UN show that there is a shift in matters of national sovereignty in regards to crisis of massive human rights violations, endemic civil wars, and failing states. The Security Council has begun to tread upon inroads of traditional state prerogatives in situation where the nation state has deteriorated to such a point that the government can no longer assure the rights and safety of the very people that provide the government their legitimacy.⁸⁶ If a situation is perceived as a major humanitarian issue (such as ethnic genocide) there may be good grounds for saying that the moral imperative overrides the strictly legal concern for non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. In cases such as this, the trend has been for the Security Council to decide to intervene casting their vote for the greater good of humanity –the cosmopolitan community.⁸⁷

Thus, through the cosmopolitan approach, there is a justification for the violation of sovereignty. A cosmopolitan approach requires respect for cosmopolitan law. Cosmopolitan law simply focuses upon the rights of individuals and not those of states. The two main components

⁸⁴ Edward Moxon-Browne. *A Future for Peacekeeping?* (NYC: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 192-200.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 56-58.

⁸⁶ Leon Gordenker, Clash and Harmony in Promoting Peace: Overview, *International Peacekeeping*, (winter, volume 5. no. 4, 1998), 6-7. Leon Gordenker is Professor Emeritus of Politics and Research Associate of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University. He is also a research fellow on the United Nations at City University of New York.

⁸⁷ Durch, ed., 5-20.

of cosmopolitan law are the Law of War and Human Rights Law.⁸⁸ The brutal tactics of new wars directly violate cosmopolitan law. This is especially obvious in the casualty statistics of new wars. As a result of the way ‘new wars’ are fought, the military to civilian casualty ratio has shifted from 8:1 prior to the 1990s, to 1:8 after the 1990’s. This is significant because this change reflects the colossal increase in human suffering. This statistics shows that instead of civilian casualties being a side effect of war, high civilian casualties is a sought after endstate of new wars. The combatants are now more concerned with population expulsion, and control through terror or extermination, than in traditional territorial gains.⁸⁹

The rights of the citizens, and their welfare supercede the territorial integrity of a failing state. If the state cannot provide the minimum-security guarantee to its citizens, then that responsibility falls upon the international community. The cosmopolitan viewpoint and the current global environment as envisioned by Kaldor, both lend credence to the concept of a force to assure the global rights of humanity. The argument continues that humanitarian intervention, through a cosmopolitan perspective can be argued as simply cosmopolitan law enforcement in an attempt to assure the rights of each person within the global cosmopolitan society. Kaldor believes that the United Nations is an excellent option to oversee employment of ‘cosmopolitan peacekeeping.’⁹⁰

Fifty years after San Francisco, there remains the recognition in the international community that multilateral cooperation is still preferable to unilateralism and that actions by the UN in the name of the international community confer a legitimacy that is well worth the difficulties of blending the various cultures and perspectives of the nations willing to be involved.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 130-150.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER III

Why Rapid Reaction

The current method of conducting UN peacekeeping, with limited resources and in an ad hoc way is a recipe for failure in the current global environment. The dilemmas faced by the UN have changed. No longer confronted with proxy wars on the fringes of the bipolar world, the UN now faces a much more complicated international arena wherein wars are primarily fought within a state rather than between states. This breed of ‘new war’⁹² presents a unique set of risks and opportunities to current and future international peacekeepers. These conflicts often escalate into guerrilla wars without clear front lines and include a mixture of war, crime and human rights violations. The main actors in these conflicts are not always readily identifiable. The primary actors are mostly paramilitary forces and armed civilians with little discipline and ill-defined chains of command within continuously shifting territorial boundaries. The majority of casualties are now civilians. The worst atrocities are reserved for those least able to defend themselves, women and children. Humanitarian emergencies sprout from these areas, infectious beyond the national borders from which they spring.⁹³

The public’s view of international crises has also changed. The media personalizes the crisis by graphically depicting the most dreadful aspects of conflict from even the most remote corners of the world. There is a nightly barrage of soul-wrenching images into the homes of people across the globe. This focus by the media has created an upswell of desire to alleviate the suffering and misfortune appearing on the nightly news. The growth in activism and the corresponding upsurge by the western population to alleviate the depicted humanitarian crises

⁹¹ Canadian Government’s study entitled, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations* (Ottawa Canada: September 1995).

⁹² ‘New wars’ is a reference to a term used by Mary Kaldor in her attempt to define the current global environment. See The discussion in Chapter II of this monograph.

⁹³ Kaldor, 8-10

forces the international community to take notice and increase the frequency of its involvement, an involvement that looks to the United Nations for leadership.⁹⁴ The UN, faced with the this upswell of public discontent, is more willing than ever to attempt decisive action to help mitigate a regional conflict in a much broader range of situations than ever before in its history.⁹⁵

The difference between the UN's ability to assume more peace operations is made clear in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace, he discusses the history use of the veto in the Security Council as a means of restricting the UN's engagement policy. Through most of the UN's history (from creation to end of the Cold War) the UN was powerlessness, and unable to take decisive action. In more than one hundred conflicts that erupted across the globe during the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council prevented the UN from intervening by casting over 279 vetoes. However, since 1990, only a handful of vetoes have been cast in the Security Council, in spite an increase of called for votes.⁹⁶ With the threat of the veto diminished, the UN faces a unique opportunity to evolve into an organization with the inherent flexibility to respond to the surging demands for peacekeeping services.⁹⁷

Although the Security Council approves more and more interventions, the slow pace of deployment, and the even slower pace of member contributions, diminishes the effectiveness of peace operations. Under the current UN peacekeeping structure, after the Security Council makes the decision to establish a peacekeeping mission, it takes an average of three to six months to deploy a peacekeeping force. Time is probably the most crucial factor in preventing an emerging crisis from erupting into a major conflict. In 1992, the Bosnian crisis erupted with the increased level of violence being carried out by the Serbs. As the crisis escalated, the UN struggled to alert, gather, deploy and engage a peace force. While the world watched UN administrators scrambled

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, Supplemental to An Agenda for Peace*, Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 3 January 1995.

⁹⁶ *Agenda for Peace*, 12-14

⁹⁷ Ibid., 11-12.

to gather the contributions of member nations, with precious days and weeks ticking by, thousands died.⁹⁸ There can be little doubt that if the UN had a capability to deploy peacekeeping forces in a timely manner, lives would have been saved. This example is but one that helps portray the need for the UN to possess just such a capability within a force it can reliably send to do peacekeeping operations such as the one it confronted in Bosnia.

On many occasions the lack of such a capability has had dramatic consequences. After the collapse of the election process and the renewal of fighting in Angola in 1993, negotiations began in Abidjan to get the peace process back on track. The two sides reached an agreement on a peace accord, but requested a UN military presence in Angola to verify and support the ceasefire. The Security Council authorized an operation, but only after a ceasefire occurred. The UN also informed both sides that even if a ceasefire occurred, and neither side wanted to agree to one without the presence of UN peacekeepers, it would still be six to nine months before the first troops would set foot in Angola.⁹⁹

The ability to conduct timely interventions and coordinated deployments in the initial phases of a peace operation are paramount for the success of UN operations. These are the areas that are often the most difficult in multinational operations. Unfortunately, conflicts such as the one in Angola and those of the 'new war' breed do not lend themselves to long lead-times. UN action is usually necessary within a very short span of time, usually less than thirty days.¹⁰⁰ In the case of Angola, the best chance of success would have been if the UN peacekeepers had arrived within the first month, immediately after both sides had signed the peace accord and when they were most willing to submit to peace overtures. By taking six months to deploy the peacekeeping force to Angola, the fleeting window of opportunity to break the cycle of violence was slammed

⁹⁸ Developing a Rapid Deployment Capability: An Old Idea for Trouble Times. *Project on Peacekeeping and the United Nations*, available at www.clw.org/pub/clw/un/rapreac.html; accessed on 6 November, 2001.

⁹⁹ Margaret Anstee, "Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy, a Test Case for UN Peacekeeping", *International Relations*, (Vol.11, No. 6, December 1993), 502.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

shut, dooming the UN's operation. Time is the crucial factor, it means the difference between a situation of fragile peace that can be positively influenced by the arrival of peacekeepers and a situation of resistant full blown conflict. Too often, after approving a peace operation, delays in troop commitments, transportation resources, or poorly coordinated planning have slowed effective UN action or excessively complicated ongoing operations.¹⁰¹

This recent history of poorly coordinated and excessively delayed UN operations gives credence to the argument that a need exists for a UN rapid reaction force to meet the challenges of peace operations in today's global environment. The mere existence of a reliable, credible capability to deploy peacekeepers within thirty days of decision by the Security Council does not automatically provide an invitation to take action. Nor would simple possession of such a capability inevitably lead to regular decisions to intervene. Caution needs to be taken so that the UN doesn't overuse the force; i.e. when you have a splendid hammer, all your problems begin to look like nails. The system of checks and balances and opportunities for member nations to give dissenting opinion serves to prevent overuse of such a capability. The Security Council's ability to call upon already existing arrangements for an RRF allows the UN's leadership to focus on searching for more effective solutions to the crisis, instead of expending time and energy gathering personnel and resources just to deploy a force. Having a rapid reaction capability assists, rather than hinders, the search for international peace and stability in an era of new wars.¹⁰²

A recent example that typifies the current problems with the execution of UN peace operations is the experience in Sierra Leone. From the moment the peace accord was signed in July 1999, the fragile situation needed a strong injection of peacekeepers to stop the infectious spread of violence. Unfortunately, as the fragile peace accord unraveled, no prepared, trained

¹⁰¹ Responding to a Crisis: Stand-by Arrangements at the United Nations. *Project on Peacekeeping and the United Nations*, available at www.clw.org/pub/clw/un/unstand.html; accessed on 10 January, 2002. 1-3.

¹⁰² Canadian Government's study, 21-30.

international peacekeepers were available to contain the violence within Sierra Leone. It wasn't until October that the Security Council authorized a peacekeeping force of 6,000 peacekeepers. The neighboring Kenyans were the first to send forces, but only 131 peacekeepers from there arrived within the 30-day goal. Other contingents dribbled in as their nations arranged transportation. By January, there were only 4,800 of the approved 6,000 peacekeepers in country. Even if all 6,000 had arrived at once, the planners had under resourced the mission and with the situation so volatile there was serious doubt as to the mission's eventually achieving success. Faced with the reality of only partial forces and no effective command and control, the Security Council realized the impossibility of what they had asked the peacekeepers to do, and in May authorized an increase in the mandate to a new total of 13,000 peacekeepers.¹⁰³ At the same time hostilities between government and rebel forces reached crisis proportions. The new UN forces never arrived and those in country were so ill-prepared that a ragtag band of rebels managed to capture over five hundred of the peacekeepers. The United Kingdom, acting unilaterally, managed to stabilize the situation and free the prisoners by deploying a heavily armed force. The UN is still attempting to recover from the loss of international prestige that followed.¹⁰⁴

Timely deployment of UN peace operations forces is not the only problem confronting the United Nations. The multinational make-up of the force also poses difficulties. Thirty-two nations were represented in the peacekeeping compilation that eventually arrived in Sierra Leone. The more international a force, the harder it is to achieve the level of cohesion required for peace operations, especially given the lack of familiarity between contingents. The UN's patchwork of peacekeepers, did not know if or which contingents would arrive from day to day. The sorrowful capture of hundreds of peacekeepers dramatically highlighted the inherent weakness in the attempting to execute a peace operation in such an ad hoc manner.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Ibid.,2.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

Why can't the UN manage a peacekeeping operation in a destitute African Country smaller in size than South Carolina? The UN peacekeeping system is slow and ineffective. The fundamental problem is that the UN has no troops. It spends precious time begging and borrowing troops, equipment, transport, and financing to mount a peace operation. The Security Council takes time to approve a mandate and then even more time is wasted assembling and dispatching the force. When the force finally arrives in the area of operations its members are usually more surprised by the nationalities represented in force than are the belligerents they are about to confront. The national contingents have different training and equipment and often, varying instructions from their home governments. The force, in effect, is a series of separate efforts lacking both a coordinated plan and confidence in each other.¹⁰⁶

The international community should support the establishment of a standing Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) under the UN. AN RRF would provide the international community a viable instrument to project military power quickly and effectively. Assuming the existence of a peace operation mandate, which implies international political cohesion to employ one, AN RRF could be deployed for a multitude of purposes: to prevent or mitigate conflicts, humanitarian assistance, traditional peacekeeping such as ceasefire monitoring or police refugee camps.¹⁰⁷

Several nations and many prestigious individuals have endorsed the concept of a UN RRF, but until recently, the idea hasn't gone very far mostly because various nations, including the United States, have opposed the idea of a standing UN Army.¹⁰⁸ Recently, however, U.S.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.2.

¹⁰⁷ Sean Scully, *Washington Times*, Armed Troops Sought for the UN, 1 June 2000.

¹⁰⁸ Focus on the UN: Supporting U.S. Interests Fact Sheet released by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, September 13, 1998, available at <http://www.state.gov/www/issues/peacesup.html>; accessed on 20 February, 2002. In 1998, the Clinton administration quietly gave the UN \$200,000 as seed money to establish the a UN military operation called the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters. A UN Secretariat official who prefers to remain anonymous explained the need for such "backdoor support." It was "because of the political sensitivity over creating an army under UN command and political authority."

George Archibald, "White House backs standby UN army," *Washington Times*, April 23, 1998.

Representatives James McGovern (Democrat) of Massachusetts and John Porter (Republican) of Illinois have introduced a bill in Congress in support of an RRF. The Bill attracted the support of over twenty other members of the House of Representatives who co-sponsored it. Congressman McGovern's resolution calls for a 6,000 man international military force that could step into dangerous situations and keep the peace at a moment's notice.¹⁰⁹ An overhaul of the creaking machinery of UN peacekeeping is long overdue. The international community must find a better way of conducting these complex operations. Perhaps, the creation of a rapid reaction force under UN auspices is an idea whose time has come.

There are four main advantages to a standing rapid reaction force: responsiveness, cost efficiency, international credibility, and deterrence. The first advantage is responsiveness. A faster, more responsive force, interposed between hostile sides during the critical early stages of a conflict can greatly mitigate tension prior to all out conflagration.¹¹⁰ A more responsive force has a much higher degree of success than does a force grouped together in an ad hoc manner and with only a limited understanding of the situation, their mission and each other. The reason a more response force has a better degree of success is the faster it can assume peace operations duties, the less entrenched the belligerents will become and the easier it will be to prove the international community is committed to seeing a mandate through to successful endstate. Having the capability to respond rapidly and decisively increases the prestige and strength of the UN in negotiations.¹¹¹ Overall, the rapid reaction force will assist the UN in employing diplomatic and economic measures to reestablish a situation.

¹⁰⁹ Scully, 2.

¹¹⁰ Diehl, 32. His concept is a rapid reaction force might be able to contain a conflict locally, thereby reducing the amount of suffering experienced preventing proliferation of further hostilities. Fully understanding that there is no one shooting back, the mission is similar to that of the smoke jumpers. They are a small well trained force who arrive at the scene of a fire early enough in its life cycle to contain it before it grows beyond their capability to control. This is highlighted in Norman McClean's, *Young Men and Fire*.

¹¹¹ Canadian Government's study entitled, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, (Ottawa Canada: September 1995). 30-42.

The second advantage of rapid reaction is its cost effectiveness and efficiency. Once a crisis erupts, that crisis initiates a chain of reactions that becomes more and more difficult to control. An initial localized conflict may be the spark that begins a refugee crisis throughout the region. Then the combination of refugee problems and including the health issues of people on the move promotes widespread environmental degradation. Eventually, there is widespread disease and starvation. If the UN had been capable of interjecting peacekeepers immediately after the Lome accord was signed, the situation in Sierra Leone could have been prevented at a much cheaper cost in terms of human suffering and national resources. The use of a rapid reaction force in the early stages of a crisis is the preferred option, rather than delaying and rectifying problems that become more complex and require a greater commitment of resources at a later period in order to achieve the same endstate.¹¹²

The third advantage gained through a rapid reaction force is an increase in international credibility. Given today's world, it is difficult to remain insulated from the political, economic, and environmental decisions of other nations.¹¹³ Unilateral intervention in the domestic affairs of another state is often viewed negatively and is usually considered an act of war. Faced with this interpretation, a unilateral intervention has limited effectiveness. Successful intervention requires that the intervening forces are perceived by the regional powers, the bordering states, and most importantly the citizens effected by the crisis as neutral and not out for their own gain. Like Kaldor's recommendations for a cosmopolitan approach, when the UN assumes the burden of a peace operation, it bringing with it the recognition and benevolence of the international community to help defuse a crisis. This recognition provides the neutrality that unilateral action lacks. It allows the UN unparalleled increases in its negotiation prestige, which translates into

¹¹² In the 1980's, emergency assistance and disaster relief accounted for some US\$300 million, or about 3% of bilateral aid. By 1993, that figure had risen to 3.2 BILLION, or over 8% of bilateral aid. As reported by DAC, 1994 Report.

¹¹³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, 6-8.

more political power to influence the different factions involved in a crisis.¹¹⁴ It is in the best interest of the members of the Security Council to facilitate the UN in becoming as capable as possible in handling the plethora of peace operations because it allows them to husband their own forces and finances for more pressing national issues. Governments now look to the UN to present solutions to problems. If the only global institution of international security is incapable of mounting an effective peace operation, the logical consequence is that the UN will become less and less a factor in international politics, which will force great powers to act unilaterally.¹¹⁵

The fourth and final advantage is one that results from the cumulative effects of the others. It is the improved deterrence the UN achieves through diplomatic action and the threat of employment of its rapid reaction capability. If there were confidence in the United Nations' ability to deploy a peacekeeping force within thirty days of a mandate's approval just the implied threat of its use might be a powerful deterrent to a regional group of belligerents. One example of where this capability to rapidly deploy could have helped deter further violence was in Bosnia. It has been suggested that tougher and earlier reaction to the Serbs interfering with the delivery of aid or their flagrant breaches of the Bosnian cease-fire might have prevented later Serbian rampages.¹¹⁶ The UN's retaining a rapid reaction capability ensures that those who are plotting some nefarious deed have to consider the international response as lead by the UN's rapid reaction capability.¹¹⁷

The turbulent world conditions unleashed by the end of the Cold War forced a shift in the status quo of peace operations. A standing UN rapid reaction force is best able to respond to the evolving crisis around the world. The ability to react with speed and decisiveness when confronted with a threatening situation, real or imminent, serves to stem violence prior to it

¹¹⁴ Dobbie, 133-135.

¹¹⁵ Canadian Study, 2-5.

¹¹⁶ Urquhart, *For A UN Volunteer Force*. The idea of a rapid reaction force as a deterrence is reiterated in the Canadian Study, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*. Its primary focus is on the idea of a vanguard concept, which has matured into the SHIRBRIG concept. See Chapter IV and V.

erupting into a broader civil, regional and/or international war. However, the mere existence of a reliable, credible capability does not automatically guarantee its effective use. It is but the military arm that, in conjunction with other methods, promotes a stable international peace.¹¹⁸

To truly possess a rapid reaction capability requires an investment in resources, time and training.¹¹⁹

In summary, the overwhelming justification for creating a UN rapid reaction force is the conditions of the globalized post-Cold War world and the corresponding new challenges faced by the United Nations urgently demand it. The UN was founded over 50 years ago primarily as a mechanism for mediating disputes and conflicts between states. It is now increasingly perceived, and called upon, as an international policeman and world emergency service. The current approach is simply no longer adequate in the face of the challenges the UN currently faces. The Security Council lacks the capacity for the kind of swift and effective action that could give the UN's peace efforts the initiative in the critical early stages of a conflict. The ability to call upon a standing rapid reaction force will help rather than hinder the search for international peace and stability in a global environment represented by organized violence and Kaldor's new wars.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Edward C. Luck, "Making Peace" *Foreign Policy*. 154.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 140.

¹¹⁹ Canadian Study, 14-20.

¹²⁰ Brian Urquhart, *The United Nations Capacity for Peace Enforcement*, available at <http://iisd1.iisd.ca/security/unac/urqudoc.htm>; accessed on 20 March 2002

CHAPTER IV

Rapid Reaction Capability

*A fire brigade that habitually arrives after the house has burned down does not inspire confidence or long maintain its credibility. Rapid reaction is the key to dealing effectively with most emergencies. This is particularly true of the outbreak of violence that the United Nations is now often called upon to deal with.*¹²¹

Sir Brian Urquhart

The rapid deployment of a peacekeeping or peace support operation is a complex undertaking involving three levels of conflict: strategic, operational, and tactical. Governments and inter-governmental organizations must be capable of functioning and employing means at all three levels to effectively influence a crisis situation. At the strategic level in the UN system, the Security Council establishes goals and transforms them into political directives, while member states and the Council determine the allocation of resources used to achieve these objectives. The Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat identify the means to achieve these political goals. The tactical level is the employment of peace forces in a crisis situation. The link between strategy and tactics is made at the operational level, where resources are allocated and directed to achieve operational objectives in fulfillment of strategic goals. The achievement of tactical objectives in field operations contributes to the accomplishment of the operational mission. In essence, this discussion is an examination of how the UN is organized to manage crises and deploy the forces of member states in response to crises. Effective crisis management involves the coordination and integration into the planning and implementation process of all levels, achieving the objectives of

¹²¹ Brian Urquhart, "Cash –Starved UN aiming big guns at anxious demand for peacekeepers", *The World Paper*, June, 2000, available at www.worldpaper.com/2000/june00/urquhart.html; accessed on 26 February, 2002.

unity of purpose and unity of effort ultimately leading to successful accomplishment of a peace mandate.¹²²

The current chapter offers a definition of and purpose for a UN rapid reaction capability. It then develops the concept of rapid reaction for the UN by looking at specific issues at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the UN. Some recommendations are provided to improve the UN's capabilities at each level.¹²³

Unlike national models, the United Nations rapid reaction force would not be expected to conduct hostile entry operations, or deploy immediately into full-scale combat operations. The intent of the force would be

...to hold, and where possible de-escalate or contain a crisis until such time as a follow-on UN peacekeeping effort can be activated, integrated, and deployed or a decision made to abandon efforts, other than diplomatic, to contain or resolve the conflict.¹²⁴

With this limited scope of mission, the size of the force can be relatively small. Historical research on peace operations has shown that the ideal size for an RRF is three thousand to five thousand personnel. This size force is capable of independent operations, is still small enough to be supported by a reasonable amount of airlift and is not an overwhelming burden on resources. The force must be modular in design so it can be tailored specifically to mission requirements. By modularity, this requires that units be in small standard packages that can be 'fitted' together under one operational headquarters, i.e.: infantry company, military police platoon, and reconnaissance troop. The UN would assign the headquarters which than command and controls the different national contingents. If the mission called for three light infantry and one motorized company, it could feasible select four different nationalities to provide one company each and would not have to accept entire battalions just to satisfy national command and control issues. This modularity provides a great deal of flexibility for employment of the force and also ensures

¹²² Canadian Study, 43.

¹²³ Ibid., 5.

¹²⁴ Canadian Study, 37-44.

only essential elements are included, preventing excessive use of limited resources. The goal for the UN is develop enough support so there is a large reserve pool of national contingents to tailor build the idea force for a mandate. By having more forces than will be required, member nations who chose not to participate in a given operation will have the freedom to do so.¹²⁵

This paper relies on the definition of rapid reaction set forth in the Canadian Government's publication, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations. An International Consultative Group co-chaired by Sir Brian Urquhart of the Ford Foundation and Dr. John C. Polanyi, Nobel Laureate of the University of Toronto and non-governmental organizations represented by such US leaders as Dr. Jessica Matthews, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations authored the study. Its central recommendations were a list of twenty-eight improvements if an RRF were to become a reality for the UN. Foremost amongst these is the vanguard concept¹²⁶, a national force earmarked for rapid deployment in support of the UN.¹²⁷ The definition of rapid reaction consisted of the following:

- The ability to acquire, analyze and take timely decisions based on early-warning data from a wide variety of sources;
- The organizational capability to prepare generic plans, including provision for transportation and logistic support, in advance of a specific crisis;
- The ability to undertake concurrent activities, such as alerting national contingents so they can begin to take preparatory actions while the UN continues to debate courses of action;
- The capability to deploy an operational-level command and control headquarters and equipment to an area of operations within seven days of a mandate being approved; and

¹²⁵ Brian Urquhart, "For a Volunteer Force." *New York Review of Books*. (July 15, 1993), 2-6.

¹²⁶ The Vanguard Concept was touted as 'the most crucial innovation in the UN's peace support operations over the next few years.' IT would serve as a link between the operational level headquarters and tactical elements provided by member nations through a standby arrangement. See Canadian Study, 52. The vanguard concept has been incorporated as part of the SHIRBRIG system explained in detail in chapter V of this document.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, iv.

- The capability to deploy a ground force of sufficient size to deal with the immediate stages of an emergency (up to approximately 5,000 military and civilian personnel) within thirty days.¹²⁸

Expanding beyond the definition of rapid reaction, there exist a set of core elements which are fundamental to the ultimate mission success of any rapid reaction organization. Each of these elements must be present, in varying degrees, within the UN organization if rapid reaction in support of peace operations is to become a functional reality. The core elements are: an early warning mechanism, an effective and efficient decision-making process, sufficient logistical support to allow mission accomplishment, inter and intra theater transport, a pool of available well-trained men and adequate finances. Each core element will be addressed with the level of operation it is most associated with: strategic, operational, or tactical.¹²⁹

A number of states and at least one international organization, NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, already have the capacity to react rapidly when confronted with a crisis. They possess all the elements required for a rapid reaction capability: an early-warning system, a capacity for contingency planning, potentially effective and timely decision making machinery at the political/strategic level, and well-trained, adequately-equipped mobile forces properly structured at the operational/tactical level. The cost of maintaining this capability at adequate levels of readiness is relatively high when compared to more traditional units. RRF units because they might be called upon to deploy into a crisis situation in a very short time frame are maintain a higher level of training which requires a greater commitment of resources to accomplish. As example of the greater cost in resources compare the number of rounds of ammunition between a

¹²⁸ Canadian Study, 40-51. For a detailed definition of rapid reaction force see pages 15-16 and Chapter III of this monograph. It is interesting to note that Sir Brian Urquhart served as one of the chairs for the Canadian study on Rapid Reaction.

¹²⁹ Peter H. Langille, "Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN Standing Forces", *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, (Vol.7, No.1, Spring 2000), 235-237. Dr. Langille teaches Canadian Foreign Policy and International Conflict Management in the Department of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario. He worked on the Government of Canada's study to enhance Rapid Reaction Deployment Capabilities that is oft cited in this monograph.

US Army Ranger battalion which is required to conduct basic marksmanship on a weekly basis to a normal US light infantry battalion which is required to conduct the same training only twice a year. Whatever the cost, in every case, the resources are made available to maintain a national RRF capability because of the proven effectiveness of these forces when integrated into their national security plans, an effectiveness which can be equally employed by the UN in meeting the challenges of today's global environment.¹³⁰

In the case of the UN, the situation is much different. UN Peacekeeping emerged not as one element of a coherent approach to international peace and security, but rather as an ad hoc response to a particular crisis, namely, the Suez conflict of 1956. UN peacekeeping has continued to expand in response to international security requirements ever since this first mission. Rapid reaction capability can be viewed as but the next step in the continuing evolution of UN peace operations.¹³¹

The UN does not require a large-scale rapid reaction force with the capability of interjecting itself into a full-scale war. However, the UN requires a force that is sufficiently flexible to meet the broadest range of scenarios and possible contingencies. In order to maintain this flexibility, the UN rapid reaction force must be modular in design, implying that the force can be expanded in national contingent packages, adjusting the size and composition depending on mission requirements. Each task group will be trained together and capable of 'fitting' within the larger command and control structure. The advantage of modularity is found in the rapidity with which the UN can shift an organization, prior to deployment, to meet the needs of a specific operational crisis.¹³²

¹³⁰ Canada Study, 6.

¹³¹ Brahimi Report, 4-6.

¹³² Brian Urquhart, "For a Volunteer Force", 3-5.

¹³² Canadian Study, 13-17. UN. 'Unity of effort' is the coordination and cooperation among all forces, not necessarily part of the same command structure but all working towards a common goal. 'Unity of Purpose' is a common understanding of the desired or intended outcome amongst forces that may not necessarily be under the same command structure.

As a rapid reaction capability is intended for use in crisis situations, the response must be a ‘multi-functional’ response, incorporating political, military, civilian, police, humanitarian, and economic elements. Within the United States, we refer to this concept as an interagency response. The idea of a rapid reaction capability as it applies to the UN cannot be divorced from this multifunctional concept. By its very nature, the UN is most effective when employing multi-dimensional methods to positively influence the causal factors of a crisis. This implies that at all three levels of conflict: strategic, operational, and tactical, the UN must employ an integrated approach reflecting and maximizing the broad range of capabilities within the UN system. Ultimately, to achieve ‘unity of purpose’ and ‘unity of effort’ on the ground, multidimensionality is a fundamental basis of modern UN peace operations.¹³³

There is a strong interagency emphasis within all rapid reaction organizations. In a national context, the military component can only achieve maximum effectiveness if it is organized in strict adherence with the principle of “unity of command”. In a multinational context, the goal is to replicate the same effective organizational structure but without the same rigorous “unity of command.” The reason for this is most national contingents wish to retain some freedom of decision making independent of the UN’s chain of command. Unfortunately, it is an ongoing challenge to improve effectiveness without strong linkages of command.

One way to achieve a greater level of effectiveness is to create a standing operational headquarters. This headquarters would ensure continuity between the disparate elements of the rapid reaction force. The rapid reaction force is composed of various national contingents with each contingent requiring deployment capability. Currently, force unity is compromised because the various contingents have not all trained together prior to deploying on a peacekeeping operation. The level of training required within a rapid reaction organization must be standardized and of high enough quality to assure success in variable mission parameters. The force must be able to quickly assemble, load equipment and travel. Once in their area of

responsibility, it must be able to transition into immediate action. Finally, the force must have enough logistics to sustain itself for the initial stages of the operation.¹³⁴

Strategic Level

At the heart of the UN's strategic-level problems are political questions of how the Security Council and General Assembly make decisions, how member nations contribute to missions in the field, and how the Secretary-General and his Secretariat receive a mandate to plan and implement operations. The decisionmaking processes at the political level needs to be improved and refined in order for missions to be conducted in a more efficient and effective manner.¹³⁵

At the level of the UN Secretariat, in addition to continuing work on 'steady-state' peacekeeping, attention should be focused on the particular requirements of rapid reaction. Systems should be established that encourage contingency planning with corresponding early identification of forces capable of deployment depending on member nation sensitivities and national requirements. As expressed by the former President of the United States, Bill Clinton, the ultimate goal is "... not to create a global high command but to enable the UN to manage its existing load more effectively."¹³⁶

At the Strategic level, one of the elements of rapid reaction is an effective decision-making process resulting in a mandate that is clear and focused. There should be a recognized chain of command that is acceptable to all member nations involved. The composition of the force should be appropriate to the mission and the chain of command. This is especially important because of the multifunctional nature of UN peacekeeping operations. There should be a defined

¹³⁴ Chayes and Raach, 39-49.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 37.

¹³⁶ US Presidential Decision Directive 25, *Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, (May 1994),

concept of the operation, an effective command and control structure and clear rules of engagement.¹³⁷

Another strategic level element that supports the decision making is an effective warning mechanism which provides advance notice of an impending conflict. The Security Council and UN member states would respond more rapidly to crisis if there were effective early warning. Given the finite level of resourcing, the Secretary-General should be encouraged to cooperate with member states with national capabilities in this arena, with a view towards refining the UN's situational awareness.¹³⁸

The goal of an early warning mechanism is to move information quickly and efficiently to the decision-makers so they can decide how to act. The earlier the UN develops a clear understanding of the situation, the better opportunity it has for effectively planning for mission accomplishment. This early warning system includes a capability to acquire, analyze and distribute information which triggers several activities: decision making at the political and strategic levels, contingency planning at the strategic and operational levels, and implementation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.¹³⁹

There is no shortage of information available to the UN. Besides the international media and the diplomatic community, the UN has a global network of programs, institutions, and specialized agencies with field offices throughout the world who at a minimum, provide general intelligence about the region they are in. The UN receives information from Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs), member states, and others who all experience the initial tremors of a conflict. Despite this plethora of information sources, a formal UN early warning system does not currently exist. Various parts of the Secretariat, including the Department of Peacekeeping

¹³⁷ Metz, 28-29.

¹³⁸ Canadian Study, 42-42.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 21

Operations do, however, conduct some level of warning alert reporting.¹⁴⁰ The UN's problem is not the absence of information. It is instead, the absence of a clear reporting chain. The flow of information and the delays encountered before information reaches the decision-makers is the primary problem. Early warning is an essential first step for the political and strategic level decision-makers to allow maximum time for thorough consideration of the options for crisis mitigation.¹⁴¹

Ideally an early warning system should trigger contingency planning as part of an automatic response to key world indicators. A sensitive political issue in the UN is contingency planning for particular countries or regions. Although there is bound to be a certain level of national sensitivity to certain crises that are 'close to home', the UN believes reluctance to contingency planning will decrease as member nations recognize the importance of contingency planning towards successful employment of a rapid reaction force.¹⁴²

Another strategic level core element required of any RRF is adequate financing. Any RRF requires financing to initially equip, train, and sustain itself for the duration of a mission. Simply deploying forces in a rapid and effective manner is an expensive undertaking. Costs mount in direct proportion to the size of an operation, the sophistication of the equipment used and the higher states of readiness of forces from contributing states. Inherently multinational peace operations, however, have the advantages of sharing the costs among many participating states. No single state is obliged to assume the high costs of creating a full capability on its own, and each state can offer national assets which reflect its strengths and capacities. Many of the fixed costs of developing a peace operation can be spread among several states, thus lowering the overhead for all participating countries. Nevertheless, there are significant resource implications, which must be weighed if an overall rapid-reaction capability is to become viable for the UN. It is

¹⁴⁰ Steven Metz, *The Future of the United Nations: Implications for Peace Operations*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993), 20.

¹⁴¹ T. Frank Criggler, "The Peace Enforcement Dilemma", *Joint Forces Quarterly Forum*, available at <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/jfq1002.pdf>; accessed on 28 December, 2001.

difficult to overemphasize the degree to which inadequate, inefficient and haphazard financing contributes to the problems of UN peace operations.¹⁴³

One way of limiting expenditures and improving on the success of peace operations is through a series of actions referred to as 'preventive diplomacy'. It is particularly favored by member states as a means of preventing human suffering and as an alternative to costly politico-military operations to resolve situations prior to conflict. Although diplomacy is a well-tried means of preventing conflict, the United Nations' experience in recent years has shown that there are several other forms of action that can have a useful preventive effect: preventive deployment; preventive disarmament; preventive humanitarian action; and preventive peace-building, which can involve, with the consent of the government or governments concerned, a wide range of actions in the fields of human rights and economic and social development. The United Nations has labeled all the events that comprise "preventive diplomacy" as "preventive action".¹⁴⁴

Annual cost of UN peacekeeping personnel and equipment peaked at \$3.6 billion in 1993, reflecting the expense of operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Peacekeeping costs fell in 1996 and 1997, to \$1.4 billion and \$1.3 billion, respectively. By 1998, costs had dropped to just under \$1 billion. With the resurgence of larger-scale operations, costs for UN peacekeeping rose to \$1.7 billion in 1999 and are estimated at about \$2.6 billion for the year 2000. All member states are obligated to pay their share of peacekeeping costs according to a formula upon which they have agreed. As of 31 October 2000, however, member states owed \$2.1 billion in current and back peacekeeping dues.¹⁴⁵ Despite the seemingly high cost of peacekeeping, peacekeeping is still a bargain. The costs of peacekeeping are miniscule when

¹⁴² *Canadian Study*, 27.

¹⁴³ Report of the Secretary-General, *Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functions of the United Nations: Restructuring of the United Nations Secretariat*, (A/49/336, August 1994), 34.

¹⁴⁴ Under-Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs, Sir Kieran Prendergast, *Preventive Action and Peacemaking*, available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm>; accessed on 2 February, 2002.

¹⁴⁵ *United Nations Peacekeeping: Questions and Answers*, 2.

compared to the costs of long term conflict, its toll in lives, property, the eventual costs of rebuilding which the UN often administers but by this point sovereignty is not an issue. As a comparison, although UN peacekeeping cost \$2.6 billion in 2000, governments spent \$750 billion on arms--a massive figure representing 2.6 per cent of world gross national product. Imagine what the collective governments could do with that some of that money if they felt the UN, through effective peace operations, help assure regional stability.¹⁴⁶

A basic financial dilemma is the difference between spending authority and the availability of hard currency. UN financial practices stipulate that the UN cannot incur financial cost if the UN does not hold the cash reserves to cover the costs.¹⁴⁷ This means that without a supply of cash, the ability to deploy in support of a crisis is negligible. A rapid reaction force, approved for deployment by the Security Council, still awaits the General Assembly's additional funding approval. The General assembly holds the purse strings for all UN operations, but the detailed process used to approve expenditure is cumbersome because of the number of voting members involved. Thus traditional funding methods are inappropriate for an RRF. A successful financial structure must have financial authority to fund the RRF. This means being able to authorize expenditures and expend funds on contingency planning or mission planning as the decision making occurs. This is best executed through an executive, not parliamentary, visibility over disbursement for a pre-defined situation. Such authority would prevent the delays that approved, mandated forces now endure as they wait the outcome of a General Assembly vote.¹⁴⁸

Over the short to medium term, consideration should be given to the development of a unified budget for peace operations which would improve the planning and forecasting processes and ensure the reliability of funding required for effective rapid-reaction. This reform would not eliminate the need for assessed contributions for individual peace operations. Nor would it permit

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Barry M. Blechman and J. Mathew Vaccaro, "Training for Peacekeeping: The United Nations' Role." *Stimson Center Report* No.12, July 1995.

the unauthorized movement of funds from one operation's budget to another. However, it would identify all operations and their resource requirements for longer periods, placing them on a more transparent financial footing while enabling member states to anticipate the funds required for future peacekeeping assessments.¹⁴⁹

The Secretary-General needs greater flexibility and discretion in preparing and mounting peace operations. The current authorization levels for planning peace operations in advance of a Security Council decision on a mission are woefully inadequate. The amounts allowed for preparation prior to a decision by General Assembly are equally unrealistic. These need to be changed in the interest of getting peace operations off the ground more quickly and, in the medium term, of producing missions which can meet their objectives in a timely, effective fashion. The Secretary General should have an immediately available standing fund which he can use for the first immediate cash needs that will arise in peacekeeping emergencies. Currently, the UN's emergency funds are inadequate to cover the short-term costs of a deployment.¹⁵⁰

In the logistical arena at the strategic level, the focus is mostly on transportation into and out of the theater containing the crisis. The UN requires a global capability to rapidly transport a force from initial staging bases to the area of operations and intra-theater movement. The primary method of moving an RRF is by air. A seminal weakness of air travel is the vulnerability and fragility of airfields. Airfields can be rendered useless by one crater or a few mines on the runway. The UN needs to develop an accurate data base about all entry locations and possible airfields to facilitate planning and execution in the earliest stages of a conflict.¹⁵¹

The availability of strategic airlift also requires careful coordination between member states with strategic aircraft, private companies with aircraft to lease, and all the contributing nations seeking lift assets. Due to an over-reliance on systems of centralized control, other

¹⁴⁹ Peter H. Langille, "Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN Standing Forces", *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, (Vol.7, No.1, Spring 2000), 235-237

¹⁵⁰ Erskine, & Urquhart, *Towards a more Effective United Nations: Two Studies*, (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. 1992), 72-74.

transportation and infrastructure initiatives at other levels are effectively discouraged. There have been several innovative management practices introduced into the UN in recent years, including a better partnership with the private sector. But even more creative procedures, such as taking greater advantage of technology in securing bids for airlift, would save time and money while preserving the principle of accountability. These and other initiatives, such as standing contractual arrangements with commercial firms, making greater use of partnerships with the private sector and coordinated use of the strategic transportation assets of member states, need to be developed if a rapid-reaction capability is to be realized. Finally, there is the issue of consensual over-flight and staging rights. These two issues must be clearly defined prior to deployment of the RRF. Overflight rights can be worked in the Security Council by special request to individually effected member nations, more challenging is where to stage the force. A recommendation by the author would have the UN lease bases in several key locations for use in assembling and deploying RRF contingents, as comparison the US use of Diego Garcia, and Guantanamo Bay Cuba.¹⁵²

Operational Level

*The planning of peacekeeping operations is the ultimate challenge because you never know where you have to operate; you never know what they want you to do; you don't have the mandate in advance; you don't have forces; you don't have transport; and you don't have money... We always have to start from zero. Each and every operation that we start, we start with nothing.*¹⁵³

Major-General Franklin van Kappen, Military Advisor to the Secretary-General, March 1997

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² H. Peter Langille, "Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN Standing Forces", *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, (Vol.7, No.1, Spring 2000), 235-237.

¹⁵³ Major General Franklin van Kappen, Military Advisor to the Secretary-General quoted in "Standby Arrangement System: Enhancing Rapid Deployment", *UN Chronicle*, (no. 1, 1997), 2. Available at <http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/1997/pl3ily97.htm>; accessed on 10 January, 2002.

The most serious problems in UN peace missions are found at the operational level, where there is a capability vacuum . The planning and organization of missions is invariably undertaken on an ad hoc basis. The UN takes months to respond to conflict in virtually every case. While missions are being planned, functions best undertaken at the operational and tactical levels are attempted at the strategic level, thus fostering an unhealthy degree of centralization at UN headquarters. This creates confusion among levels of authority, and slows reaction times.¹⁵⁴

Once approved for deployment, standby units will have to travel independently and assemble in-theater. For some, this will be the first experience of working together, and it will likely occur under conditions of extreme stress. Some military establishments are reluctant to acknowledge the need for prior training of their personnel beyond a general combat capability. Thus, high standards of cohesiveness and interoperability will be difficult to assure in advance of an operation, unless the nation creates a dedicated force designed to fold within a UN RRF.

In terms of education, it is my opinion that the United Nations needs to establish several tiers of schools. One that is focused on senior noncommissioned officers and junior officers that is designed to train standard operating procedures and techniques employed during UN peace operations, as well as familiarization with UN standard equipment. At the field grade officer level, there needs to be a course designed on the staff college model that is focused on operational level issues and challenges faced by international peace operations, as well as regional familiarization. If the UN started with modest classes focused on member nations' militaries, this would help inculcate the doctrine and understanding necessary for successful RRF peace operations.

One method of improving the synchronization between national contingents, and mitigating national concerns about UN control over their troops, is by creation of ad hoc Troop Contributors Committees (TCC). A TCC would consist of all member states with on call forces. The TCC would serve as a formal vehicle for the transmission of national views to the Secretary-

¹⁵⁴ *Canadian Study*, 48-49.

General and Security Council on operational issues and concerns of member nations. To enhance rapid reaction to crisis situations, TCCs could be created prior to action in the Security Council while mandates are developed and contributors are approached for participation. This would permit examination of the Secretary-General's emerging plan for the operation, including such issues as command and control arrangements and rules of engagement. Consideration of these types of questions in a TCC would help the Security Council in arriving at decisions on mandates by ensuring that operations were supported by potential troop contributing nations.¹⁵⁵

To build on formal mission-specific committees, it would also be useful to establish an institution where troop contributors could share their expertise and experience on a range of general operational issues which cut across many peacekeeping operations. This type of operational discussion would complement the work of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the acknowledged policy organ reporting to the General Assembly. The most appropriate body would be a formal Troop Contributors Forum, consisting of leading or major Member states engaged in peace operations or having standby arrangements with the UN. The Forum would meet regularly to discuss issues in the Standby Arrangements System and technical issues including logistics and transportation. These institutional innovations have a strong bearing on the ability of the UN to deploy personnel rapidly. Better consultative arrangements for troop contributors would instill greater confidence among troop contributing nations, promote the availability of more personnel, help to enhance quality and preparedness for a larger number of missions, and assist the UN in ensuring a faster, more effective response to crisis.¹⁵⁶

The current UN system is extraordinarily complex and there is nothing approaching a 'standard operating procedure' for any stage of a UN peace operation. There is no Secretariat unit which can take a draft plan and transform it into an "options paper", with a fully staffed list of options and the risks and resourcing requirements for the operation. There is no organization

¹⁵⁵ *The Brahimi Report to the United Nations*, available at www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations accessed on 12 January, 2002.

within the UN that provides clear, unequivocal and achievable operational guidance so essential if the Security Council goals and strategic objectives are to be met.¹⁵⁷

An example of the failure of the UN to properly plan a peace operation is the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG). The Security Council approved the peace mandate on 16 February 1989. By 1 April there were only 291 unarmed military observers in the country with few armed peacekeepers. The UN's force goal was 4,650 peacekeepers for the UNTAG mission. Unfortunately, 1 April was also the day hostilities began again with rebels crossing the border from Angola. From 2 to 8 April, 1989, intense fighting between the two sides results in over 2,000 people killed.¹⁵⁸ As noted by Virginia Page Fortuna in, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping,

...advanced operational planning was one of the weakest aspects of UNTAG. The UN spent a decade working hard for the political settlement but did not develop operational plans sufficiently during that period to be ready when the settlement came through....

An effective decision-making process is one that seamlessly integrates the strategic influence, the operational leadership, and the tactical realities to effectively carryout a mandate until all requirements are met. To facilitate this, UN headquarters should develop an understanding of the particular hazards of a given field situation and the strengths and weaknesses of the contingents committed to a particular mission. There is a need for experienced peacekeepers to work within the advisory panels of UN headquarters. This results in a more efficient assignment of troops to tasks within a given crisis area. Overall, at all levels the longer and more familiar a command and control relationship exists, the more effective it will be.

One recommendation at the operational level includes a permanent operational-level rapid reaction headquarters. This multinational group of thirty to fifty personnel, augmented in times of crisis, would conduct contingency planning and rapid deployment as authorized by the

¹⁵⁶ *Canadian Study*, 51-54.

¹⁵⁷ Report of the Secretary-General, "*Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping*", 14 March 1994. (A/48/403), available at: www.smh.com.au/news/0009/06/text/world1.html.12.

Security Council. The headquarters would have a civil affairs branch and links to related agencies, including non-governmental and regional organizations. Aside from liaison and planning functions, the Secretary General or Security Council could assign it with training objectives in preparation for particular deployments.¹⁵⁹ The headquarters is designed as an operational level command and control facility incorporating tactical planning capabilities. It should be a standing modular structure that with approval of additional funding would expand as required. It must be deployable on short notice and provide the initial nucleus of a headquarters for a peace operation. It must be integrated within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is subordinate to the Secretary General. It must have a common Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).¹⁶⁰

Another core element of RRF that involves operational issues is financing. Financing of UN peace operations must provide officials responsible for the conduct of a mission with adequate financial authority to meet mission requirements, including disbursement on the ground. Adequate finances depend upon full funding of a rapid reaction capability and the existence of rules and regulations which allow the timely disbursement of funds within well-understood principles of accountability.¹⁶¹

Rapid reaction capability must have enough logistical support to sustain itself during at least the initial phases of an operation, until either relieved by follow-on forces or resupplied once adequate facilities are secured. Local conditions can vary tremendously and advance planning must take into account the extent to which a rapid reaction unit can count on host nation support for even very basic items such as drinking water. Contingency operational planning must be

¹⁵⁸ Virginia Page Fortna, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*.

¹⁵⁹ Urquhart, available at <http://iisd1.iisd.ca/security/unac/urqudoc.htm>.

¹⁶⁰ H. Peter Langille, "Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN Standing Forces", *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, (Vol.7, No.1, Spring 2000), 235-240.

¹⁶¹ *Canadian Study*, 24-26.

based upon 'worse-case scenarios' but must retain enough flexibility to allow for any number of branches and sequels once a mission has begun.¹⁶²

Another logistical challenge is one of equipment standardization. By their very nature, UN peace operations are composed of contingents from many disparate regions which will have a multitude of different equipment and logistical requirements. As example, the Multinational Force and Observer mission, Sinai (MFO) has a Fijian battalion of infantry. This battalion is one of three in the entire Fijian army. One of the other two is stationed in Lebanon. As part of their agreement with the UN, the Fijians require that their soldiers are supplied with yaqona, a special root that is only found in the Polynesian islands.¹⁶³ One recommendation for equipment standardization is to develop classifications from low-level compatibility (differences don't hinder an operation) to inter-changeability (where substitution is feasible) to commonality (where the same equipment is used or the same procedures are adopted.)

Tactical Level

At the tactical level of the UN system, virtually all of assets belong to member states. If the concept of rapid reaction is to become a valid response in today's environment, capable, multifunctional personnel who can form part of any UN rapid reaction mission group must be provided. This is best achieved through the development of uniform training and equipment guidelines which will ensure a minimum level of performance and equipment standards when national units are deployed under the operational control of the UN.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Brahimi Report, 12-15.

¹⁶³ Personal observation from the Author's peacekeeping tour in the Sinai from June of 1995 to January of 1996. Also available from <http://www.fiji-islands.com/kava-kava-yaqona.html>; as accessed on 5 January, 2002. The Fijians grind down the root and enjoy it in lieu of alcoholic drinks, which they are forbidden from drinking. In Fiji- and other parts of Polynesia -- the drinking of yaqona (pronounced Yangona) or kava, is a common ceremonial and social custom. The yaqona ceremony has great significance in Fijian life but is now considered a social drink as well as a ceremony. Yaqona drinking is common in Fijian villages and it is quite normal to see groups of men gathered around the tanoa swapping stories as the bilo, a half coconut shell, is passed around.

¹⁶⁴ Canadian Study, 36-45.

Currently, it takes an average of three to six months to deploy peacekeeping troops following approval of a peace operations mandate by the Security Council. This three to six month lag from approval to actual execution is critical because it is during this period that the crisis situation can worsen dramatically. Such delays usually allow a conflict to escalation while the opportunity for peaceful negotiations dwindles. It is during this crucial period of 180 days, between decision and deployment, when the belligerents are aware of the peacekeepers that the worst civilian casualties and human rights violations occur.¹⁶⁵ A rapid reaction force provides the UN, if it decides to employ it, a capability to stabilize a crisis situation by providing the international community more time to marshal more traditional mobilized peacekeeping units.¹⁶⁶

The tactical element of financing could be addressed by creating a revolving reserve fund for peacekeeping of U.S.\$400 million¹⁶⁷. This amount would permit it to fund start-up costs of several large operations. Peacekeeping forces could be given proper logistical support, thorough communications, and immediate airlift capacity, without having to wait for contributions to come in or to borrow from other accounts.¹⁶⁸

Tactically, an RRF element requires well-trained personnel. The very core of a rapid reaction force is well trained, adequately equipped personnel. UN operations reflect the strengths and weaknesses of their component parts, and there is a huge variance in the level of training between national contingents. Because personnel in a rapid reaction operation must deploy immediately and cannot conduct mission-specific training, the units involved must be similarly trained. It does no good to have a crack infantry unit available as part of an RRF, if the truck unit is so poorly trained, the infantry cannot use the trucks to respond to a situation in its

¹⁶⁵ *Campaign for U.N. Reform. Fact Sheet on HR 938: Proposal to establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force*, available at www.cunr.org/HR%20938%20facts%20and%20figures.htm; accessed on 27 October 2001.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ This sum is a compilation of several sources and is the one the author believes is most representative of current opinions. See the Brahimi Report, available at www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations accessed on 12 January, 2002.

area of responsibility. Clearly, the UN's ability to standardize levels of training across the gamut of troops within a rapid reaction force is a major hurdle to the ultimate success of a peace force.¹⁶⁹

In addition to basic military training, which is a prerequisite for any military unit in high risk situations, rapid reaction force soldiers must have training in skills appropriate to a variety of missions, based upon contingency plans or likely scenarios. In addition to the required military skills, peace forces must also receive training on the cultural and organizational specifics of the region to which they are deploying. It would be a great help to the UN to employ regional experts who are capable of traveling to units designated as part of the RRF pool and teach regional specific classes. In certain situations these regional experts could deploy as part of the RRF headquarters in an advisory role to the force commander.¹⁷⁰

In order to function cohesively, most organizations, whether national or international, need to train and exercise together in advance of crisis. This implies a foundation of similar policy, common doctrine or standard operating procedures disseminated and understood among all participating member states. There is a demonstrated need for the UN to establish an office within the Department of Peacekeeping that sets out a standard for doctrine and training. Although the skeletal beginnings of this exists, it will need to be further fleshed out before peace operations are conducted under anything similar to standard operating procedures from one mission to the next.¹⁷¹

To enhance rapid reaction, the UN and member states need to address the nature of training to be conducted and the management systems which should be put into place to ensure that national training programs are more responsive to the UN's requirements for the maintenance of global stability.¹⁷² Personnel who can function adequately in multinational operations require a

¹⁶⁸ Brian Urquhart, *The United Nations Capacity for Peace Enforcement*, available at <http://iisd1.iisd.ca/security/unac/urqudoc.htm>; accessed on 20 March, 2002.

¹⁶⁹ Blechman & Vaccaro.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ *Canadian Study*, 33.

¹⁷² Ibid., 53-55.

set of authoritative policies and procedures referred to as doctrine, which creates consistency of purpose and goals from mission to mission. Doctrine does not evolve in a vacuum, it is developed from a common education and understanding. It is also derived from lessons learned by both earlier UN operations and other historical examples. At the international level, achieving formal agreement on doctrine is inherently difficult because of the consensus required to issue it. Once issued, it must be followed as closely as possible.¹⁷³ Through standardized training events with mandatory standards that must be met prior to a deployment UN peace operations doctrine will achieve a satisfactory measure of inculcation in the national contingents. Just as rapid reaction poses special problems operationally, logistically and financially, the development of effective doctrine for rapid deployment will require a particularly well-focused effort on the part of the UN and member states.

Historically, the UN's historical record for peace operations has never been based on sound doctrinal foundations.¹⁷⁴ A rapid reaction force, limited in number and resources, relies on the synergy of the six core elements to successfully accomplish a mission. This synergy is only possible when everyone understands their role within the organization, something only achievable through a standing doctrine.¹⁷⁵ Lester Pearson, who summarized the fate of an organization lacking doctrine when he said more than forty years ago,

“Are we to go on from crisis to crisis improving in haste? Or can we now pool our experience and our resources, so that the next time, we the governments and people whom the United Nations represents, will be ready and prepared to act?”¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Alan F. Kay et al., *Financing UN Functions in the Post Cold War Era*, 3.

¹⁷⁴ Smith, Ed., 3-5.

¹⁷⁵ Gareth Evans, “A UN Volunteer Force: Four Views.” *New York Review of Books* XL, (12 June 1993), 57-58.

¹⁷⁶ Dr. Fen Osler Hampson, A Commentary on the Brahimi Report, *The Defense Associations National Network*, (Vol. 7, No. 3 Winter, 2000), 1-3. Lester Pearson was one of the lead politicians who helped launch the United Nations and the Atlantic Alliance. His involvement with the UN is best remembered for his part in defusing the Suez crisis of 1956. He received the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded in 1957 for his

Another major variable is how well trained a military force is. These units, trained for the traditional duties of a national armed force, perform non-traditional duties as UN peacekeepers. As more peacekeeping operations are established, military units will be drawn from a wider range of countries, whose military force may in many instances, have no experience in UN peacekeeping. The concern is that forces from countries with less rigorous training standards and resources to conduct mission-specific training, may lack the requisite level of training thus negatively impacting the effectiveness of the operation.¹⁷⁷ Professionalism results from a common training program that enables soldiers from a variety of national backgrounds to absorb and put into practice, a common set of standards, procedures and objectives in peacekeeping operations.¹⁷⁸

The concept of Rapid Reaction is not a new one. In recognition of a need to deploy large numbers of persons in relatively short periods of time, many states and multinational organizations have created elements for this purpose. This concept is mainly, but not exclusively, a military one. Rapid reaction capabilities focus primarily on planning, decision-making, personnel, logistics, transportation, and equipment issues. These are the elements that the UN must acquire if it is serious about developing a rapid reaction capacity.

The history of traditional peace operations shows that the UN suffers from deficiencies in all three levels of operations: strategic, operational, and tactical. These shortfalls need to be addressed if a rapid reaction force is to become a reality. Attempting to satisfy the conditions of a mandate with an incapable rapid reaction force only invites disaster. Well-trained and well-

initiative in establishing the UN Emergency Force in Gaza. Also of note, in 1952 and 1953 he was President of the UN General Assembly. It was during this time that the assembly resolved the Korean conflict.

¹⁷⁷Browne, Marjorie, 30-32.

¹⁷⁸Browne, 192-200. The author is the Jean Monnet Chair of European Integration at the University of Limerick in Ireland.

equipped personnel, the existence of pre-arranged transportation, and a well-sourced logistics network are all fundamental in making rapid reaction a reality for the United Nations.

Over the long term, the establishment of rapid reaction mechanisms with the necessary reforms mentioned in this chapter are possible if member nations are able to alter or reverse current attitudes, including refusals to undertake financial obligations and to increase spending to the organization. Increased spending to create a rapid reaction capability is not as improbable as it sounds, if viewed as a partial replacement for the need for numerous national expenditures on defense in the realm of peace operations. Taken in this light, a UN standing rapid reaction force might be seen as ‘freeing up’ large resources now devoted to national military establishments. Clearly, if there existed the political will to endow the United Nations with the independent and sufficient resources it need to conduct more effective peacekeeping operations then the creation of a rapid reaction force might be attainable.¹⁷⁹

Fifty-six years after the United Nations was formed, we continue to explore ways to empower the organization. On balance, its record in preventing and resolving violent conflict is characterized by modest progress; not what it could or should be. Recent efforts to enhance a UN rapid deployment capability have had similar progress. There is agreement that preventive action, through a combination of conflict resolution, diplomacy, and even prompt deployments, is far more cost effective than later, much more resource intensive efforts.

¹⁷⁹ *Peacekeeping and Rapid Deployment*, available at www.dfait-aei.gc.ca/peacekeeping/rri1e.asp accessed on 12 January, 2001.

CHAPTER V

Increasing UN's Capability

The Dilemma confronting all hopes of peaceful international change and settlement is that there can be no change and no settlement, not even peacefully, so long as struggle is avoided. You may count on the fingers of one hand the occasions on which agreements have been made and changes of sovereignty or transfers of territory that have occurred in the modern world without the assistance of the possibility of a resort to force, if not of force itself.

*F.H.Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace*¹⁸⁰

Like war itself, a peace operation is a military undertaking with a political aim. Unlike warfare, with its long history of lessons, peace operations are a relatively recent military phenomenon that arose with international laws circumscribing 'aggressive war' circa the 1890s . Although historical precedent is growing, the lessons are still fresh and have not been fully examined. This fact alone makes peace operations, in all its forms, a special challenge not only for international leadership but for those who have to execute it, the peacekeepers. The future of peacekeeping involves policy challenges especially in the areas of multilateral operations, mission termination, and combat effectiveness.¹⁸¹

The prevailing opinion of the 1990s was that the world will continue to find United Nations peacekeeping to be a useful tool in advancing conflict resolution and peacemaking. But as the world looks more and more frequently to the United Nations, the UN faces a number of problems that might affect its capacity to establish successful peace operations. To overcome these difficulties, a number of suggestions have emerged. The one with the most potential for the UN's efforts at creating a rapid reaction capability is the SHIRBRIG (Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade) concept. SHIRBRIG is a Danish initiative that developed from the idea of the

¹⁸⁰ F.H.Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, (Dobbs Ferry NY: Oceana Publications, 1973).

¹⁸¹ James H. Baker, Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations, *Parameters*, (Spring 1994), 13-26.

“vanguard concept” as described within the recommendations of the Canadian study, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations. SHIRBRIG is a military force developed to employ rapid reaction capabilities to deploy to a regional crisis to prevent the situation from escalating. The composition of the force is based on the UN arrangement system, which keeps troops under national command authority until requested by the UN. Since 1995, nations have been working toward the realization of the SHIRBRIG initiative for UN rapid reaction. Current participants include Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. Additionally, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia are observer nations and are seriously considering participation. SHIRBRIG is funded by those states that choose to participate. Canada, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden have all signed a Letter of Intent and are providing staff to the SHIRBRIG Planning Element, based in Copenhagen.¹⁸²

SHIRBRIG has recently added a planning element that is working towards concepts, policies and doctrine in the areas of communications, operations, activation, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the method of declaring national contingents ready to deploy as part of a peace operation. A product of these efforts is the development of Standard Operating Procedures, or SOPs, which are currently in draft format.¹⁸³

Another option being employed to enhance rapid reaction capability is the United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS). There are over 80 countries that have volunteered to participate in UNSAS which has led to some improvements in preparation for rapid reaction peacekeeping. Over 20 of those countries have signed formal memorandums of understanding with the UN. Unfortunately, the Department of Peacekeeping believes that less than half of the nations currently enrolled have response times of 30 days or less. Even worse, 30 percent require

¹⁸² *Peacekeeping and Rapid Deployment*, available at www.dfait-aeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/rtrn11e.asp accessed on 12 January, 2001.

¹⁸³ SHIRBRIG Concept, available at http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/1999/feb99/shirbrig_b_e.htm; accessed on 20 February, 2002.

more than 90 days before their troops can be employed in a UN peacekeeping mission. To combat this discrepancy in deployment standards, the DPKO has tiered readiness depending on how much time the RRF has to prepare prior to initial deployment. The later contingents could actually be very useful to reinforce the initial RRF. UNSAS does not require as serious a commitment as does SHIRBRIG because a member nation does not have to identify the actual troops that are placed at the UN's disposal. It does allow many more members to participate than does SHIRBRIG and it provides a greater amount of resources that can be used in more traditional peacekeeping or even as a replacement for SHIRBRIG once a crisis has been initially contained.¹⁸⁴

Potential limitations/Objections

Any number of possible objections can be made regarding the idea of a UN rapid reaction force. It might raise, for example, the specter of supra-nationality that has always haunted the idea of a standing UN army. Others may fear that a UN volunteer force will run the risk of acquiring a "mercenary" image. If, however, the force can only be deployed with the authority of the Security Council, the necessary degree of control by member governments is guaranteed. Outstanding leadership, high standards of recruitment, training, and performance, and dedication to the principles and objectives of the UN also would help to address such concerns. The main difference as compared with peacekeeping will be the role, the volunteer nature, and the immediate availability of the force.¹⁸⁵

If rapid reaction is a demanding concept, it is an even more difficult reality to achieve. The United Nations must be sure of each critical element in the process. Missing components

¹⁸⁴ Jerome Hule, "81 States Ready to Join UN Peacekeeping System", *Panafrican News Agency*, (April 2, 1999). Available at www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/hule.htm accessed on 7 January, 2001.

¹⁸⁵ Urquhart, <http://iisd1.iisd.ca/security/unac/urqudoc.htm>.

and conditional agreements can only lead to delays. It may be wise, therefore, to temper our expectations by acknowledging some inherent problems.¹⁸⁶

Standby arrangements for nationally based units do not provide an assurance of their immediate availability. As the former Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, acknowledged in 1995, ‘a considerable effort has been made to expand and refine standby arrangements, but these provide no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation.’¹⁸⁷ With respect to UNSAS, there are few, if any, guarantees. The promptness with which national contingencies are provided will depend on the discretion of participating member states, the risks perceived, and the level of interest at stake.¹⁸⁸

The very frequency of peace operations has further complicated in successful fulfillment of a mandate. It becomes harder to effectively manage each individual operation, as more and more are added. In the 1992 study by the Secretary General, An Agenda For Peace,¹⁸⁹ the Secretary General describes the range of peace and security activities undertaken by the UN: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building actions. An Agenda for Peace was conceived and written in the aftermath of the Cold War when the international community was optimistic about the prospect for future international cooperation in peace operations.¹⁹⁰ It is perhaps because the UN has undertaken so many missions in the early 1990’s with mixed results that since then there has been a considerable scaling back of new peace operations. As discussed earlier, creating a central headquarters to manage and run the strategic and operational level coordination issues between different missions can also mitigate this problem.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Boutros Boutros-Ghali. *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*. (S/1995/1, January 3, 1995), 11.

¹⁸⁸ *Peacekeeping in a Changing Context*, available at www.un.org; accessed on 25 March 2002; It is evident that member states possess the capabilities needed for a rapid reaction force; what is needed is the will to make them available for the execution of the Security Council mandates.

¹⁸⁹ *Agenda for Peace*, 13-15.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

Reliability will also be a key determinant of rapid deployment. In the case of UNSAS, there is no assurance that the political will exists to commit individual member nations troops into potentially life threatening situations. Critics frequently point to the refusal of member states to provide adequate forces to avert the 1994 catastrophe in Rwanda. Not one of the 19 governments that had undertaken to have troops on standby for UN peacekeeping agreed to contribute to the UNAMIR mission under these arrangements.¹⁹¹ The counter argument is that the UNSAS system has been expanded and improved, but commitment to the system will have to be far more comprehensive and binding if it is to succeed. The onus is now clearly on member states to demonstrate the viability of this system.¹⁹²

Once approved for deployment, standby units will have to stage independently and assemble in-theater. For some, this will be the first experience of working together, and it will likely occur under conditions of extreme stress. It is not the preferred method of introducing soldiers to something new. Some military establishments are reluctant to acknowledge the need for prior training of their personnel beyond a general combat capability. Thus, high standards of cohesiveness and interoperability will be difficult to assure in advance of the operation. The UN will continue to confront the complex task of coordinating lift capabilities for participating elements across the world. This is just one more factor that slows the rate of deployment. Logistics and sustainment are improving but the UN remains challenged to provide different national contingents with a wide range of equipment.¹⁹³

By freezing a conflict, peacekeeping favors the status quo at the time of its deployment. This makes it more difficult for UN peacekeeping forces to stay neutral in a civil conflict than in an interstate war. Cease-fires "in-place" might legitimize ethnic cleansing by the party which militarily is most powerful. Efforts to delay a ceasefire until territorial gains have been forcibly

¹⁹¹ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, 12.

¹⁹² H. Peter Langille, "Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN Standing Forces", *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, (Vol.7, No.1, Spring 2000), 235-237.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 235-238.

reversed will drag the UN into the quagmire of an internal war. The predicament of peacekeeping soldiers on the ground is that they are unable to move forward, unable to stay put taking casualties for no purpose, and unable to withdraw without repercussions for national foreign policies and UN credibility. Australian Gen. John Sanderson (retired), force commander of the generally successful UN operation in Cambodia, argues that peace enforcement is "war by another name." Often the choice for the peacekeepers, he says, is "you either go to war or go home."¹⁹⁴

Attempting to conduct peacekeeping on the cheap is a recipe for failure. The fundamental problem for the UN is that it does not own any troops. It has to beg, borrow, or cajole troops, equipment, transport, and of course, money to undertake a peacekeeping operation. It takes time for the UN to decide to undertake an operation and then even more time to gather the momentum to accumulate everything needed for the operation. When the force finally arrives in country, it is usually made up of soldiers from many countries, which implies that they have not trained together and do not share common operating procedures. Then one has to consider what are the national interests of each contingent. All this implies that many peacekeeping forces arrive on the ground able to achieve little more than a show of force.¹⁹⁵

As example the UN mission to Rwanda in 1993 highlighted the unwillingness of member nations to contribute forces. The reluctance of troop contributions first delayed the deployment of peacekeepers and ultimately led to abysmal mission failure of this mission. Despite the multitude of warning signs that a crisis was imminent, the international community remained unprepared. The initial peace accord was signed in 1993. Unfortunately, the Security Council waited two months before authorizing an assistance mission for Rwanda. Even after this two-month preparation, troop deployments never materialized. The accord placed the responsibility for 4,000

¹⁹⁴ Ramesh Thakur, "The U.N.'s impossible task", Special to *The Japan Times* (Tokyo, Sunday May 28, 2000).

¹⁹⁵ Larry Thompson, "Just What Will It Take to Learn Our Peacekeeping Lesson?", *Christian Science Monitor*, (July 12, 2000).

soldiers on the UN, but only 2600 troops were eventually committed to the mission. Of those, only the 400 Belgians came with enough support to operate independently. More than half actually arrived with little more than their rifle.¹⁹⁶ The situation continued to escalate as the peacekeepers gathered and unfortunately, but not unpredictably, the situation finally erupted it into full-scale ethnic war and genocide.¹⁹⁷

By April 1994, the slaughter was in full gear but it took the Security Council until June to vote for a new mandate requesting another 5,500 troops from member nations. By August, only additional 2,500 peacekeepers out of the 5,500 deployed into the area of operations. The end toll in human suffering was over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus killed before the two sides slaked their thirst for blood, and exhausted, ended the violence.¹⁹⁸

If a UN force had been available for deployment within the first thirty days, it might have prevented the serious deterioration in the situation. The critical lesson of the Rwanda experience is that modest but timely employed forces can stabilize a situation enough for a diplomatic efforts to attempt to return some normalcy to the region. At least, such a force prevents a situation from escalating to such a degree that it overwhelms the UN's ability react.¹⁹⁹ There are many who believe that a rapid reaction response within the first weeks of the Security Council authorization would have interceded between the elements that fueled the ethnic war, arresting them while they still smoldered before the flames caught hold and the fatal eruption that is full-blown war.

There is a fear, especially in the United States, that political control over decisions regarding the types of situations which the UN responds to will be removed from national influence with the creation of a standing RRF. This argument supposes the UN might employ the RRF without US support, which is impossible considering US veto powers in the Security Council. Since recent peace operations have seen a shift towards more liberal ROE in regards to

¹⁹⁶ Canadian Study, 44.

¹⁹⁷ *Agenda for Peace Ten Years on: Enhancing the UN's Peace and Disarmament Work*, available at www.una-uk.org/UN&C/agendaforpeaceplus10.html; accessed on 25 February, 2001.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

the use of force, the erosion of state consent prior to deploying a peace force, and the trend to be more willing to intervene in domestic affairs of states, the UN is sometimes seen as a party to the conflict rather than as a neutral actor. Increasingly therefore, peace operations have resulted in more costly and dangerous operations being undertaken than in the past. Somalia is the perfect example of this point. Resolution No. 794, passed in late 1992 by the Security Council established Operation Restore Hope, a mission designed “to create an environment for the effective dissemination of humanitarian relief efforts.” It was not clearly endorsed within the Somali clan culture, and central government had eroded to the point that there was no ‘state’ acceptance of the UN forces. As a result, it became a very costly operation with UN forces viewed more and more as just another factional power. As a result, the UN was able to achieve very little lasting change and when Operation Restore Hope ended, the internal Somali situation simply reverted back to the status quo.²⁰⁰

A firm commitment by the Security Council to adopt peace enforcement could be a major means of mitigating some of the concern of the international community about UN intervention. Clearly defined ROE for employment of the RRF for humanitarian situations, mostly the cases involving a perceived violation of sovereignty, can be justifiably explained to the international community. The UN within the next decade will have a preliminary rapid deployment capability for peace support operations. There are continuing substantive increases in the quantity and quality of resources listed in the UNSAS. A UN rapid deployment mission headquarters may soon be available to assist in the critical start-up phase of new operations. A multinational Standby High-Readiness brigade is available. As previously noted, over the past five years there has been substantive innovation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

In 1998, the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The award was in clear recognition of the unique and indispensable role the UN peacekeeping

¹⁹⁹ Canadian Study, 19-20.

had played in the last 40 years in international conflict resolution. It was also a statement of hope for the future. The Euphoria of the 1990's has quickly deteriorated. Instead of presiding over a new world order, the UN has been overwhelmed by the sudden demand for peacekeeping forces to carry out continuously more complex operations. The demand is long past the point of overwhelming the UN's financial and human resources. After so much promise, UN peacekeeping in its current state is now seen as ineffective. It has become the victim of the international communities failure to agree on clear guidelines, to develop realistic mandates and to provide adequate resourcing for the agreed upon mandates. The UN has made modest progress since William R. Frye made the case for a planned evolution in his 1957 study, *A United Nations Peace Force*. We have yet to achieve Frye's objective, but it is worth recalling his words:

Establishment of a small, permanent peace force, or the machinery for one, could be the first step on the long road toward order and stability. Progress cannot be forced, but it can be helped to evolve. That which is radical one year can become conservative and accepted the next.²⁰¹

The response to the challenge we face cannot be to disregard the United Nations. An established RRF would alleviate some of the pressure on the United States and other larger powers to have to act unilaterally to alleviate a humanitarian crisis situation. Ending conflict and preserving peace today demand a more refined, international character to peacekeeping operations. Adequate preparation, well-trained peacekeepers and a capacity to act quickly are the essence of the UN's ability to react in a rapid and effective manner to situations of crisis. In new war crisis, the response time can be what separates success from failure.

There is a better way, the international community should establish a standing force of soldiers that can respond to emergencies. This rapid reaction force would train together, follow the same doctrine, use the same equipment, and learn to speak the same language. It would have an established chain of command, and be prepared for deployment with little warning. It would

²⁰⁰ Lynn E. Davis, *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking after the Cold War*, (The Rand Summer Institute, 1993), 11.

follow intervene to guarantee the rights of citizens of the international community, no matter how remote their location. It would be the international community's most effective instrument to project military power into a potential crisis situation.²⁰²

Rather than await the next catastrophe, it is time to consider how additional SHIRBRIGs and dedicated UN standing elements might be introduced as a complementary expansion on current arrangements with the goal of achieving a standing rapid reaction force. Further progress will likely depend on far wider educational efforts directed not only at the governments of UN member states but also at global civil society. The United Nations' peace operations inherently represent the multinational character of the organization and it is this character which is an expression of international solidarity and carries with it an indispensable legitimacy. This legitimacy is not enough, if the UN is going to be able to continue to meet the challenges of today's global environment, it must be resourced with a rapid reaction capability. A capability that must have the support and backing of member nations if the United Nations itself is going to remain a hope for all into the next century.

This monograph has examined whether a standing rapid reaction force is viable for United Nations' peace operations. It has detailed the global environment and the challenges in peace operations presented by globalization and 'new wars'. In issues of sovereignty, the 'Cosmopolitan Approach' highlights that the realist view of sovereignty, where state to state relationships are paramount, is too simplistic. Insertion of a UN rapid reaction force without the consent of the state involved normally violates the norms of sovereignty. However, under the Cosmopolitan Approach, since the state failed at one of its most important tasks, safety of its citizens, United Nations intervention is justified.

Throughout its history, the UN has employed peacekeeping forces hurriedly assembled from member nations to maintain global security and assist in assuring regional stability and

²⁰¹ William R. Frye, *A United Nations Peace Force*, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1957), 106.

²⁰² Ibid.

global peace. The current method of conducting UN peacekeeping, on the cheap and on an ad hoc basis, is a recipe for failure in the current globalized, new war plagued, international environment. The ability to conduct timely interventions and coordinated deployments in support of peace operations is paramount for the success of UN operations. This requires a rapid reaction capability.

A rapid reaction force provides the international community a viable instrument to project military power quickly and effectively. A rapid reaction force could be deployed for a multitude of purposes. There are four main advantages to a standing rapid reaction force: responsiveness, cost efficiency, international credibility, and deterrence. Each are required by the UN in order to create an effective rapid reaction force.

Although the UN is struggling to overcome deficiencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation, none of the issues addressed have been found to be insurmountable. Ultimately the creation of a standing rapid reaction peace operations force is possible. With the momentum gained through improvements over the last five years, a UN rapid reaction force is a viable response to the challenges faced in today's global environment.

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